The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory by Solum, Lawrence B.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 2 Article 3
2005
The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory
Lawrence B. Solum
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 Brook. L. Rev. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol70/iss2/3
The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional
Theory
Lawrence B. Solum'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE MOST DYSFUNCTIONAL BRANCH ............................................... 476
II. INSTITUTIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION .......... 479
A. The General Role of Context ...................................................... 479
B. The Case for the Essential Role of Institutionalism ................. 480
C. Scrutiny of the Case for Institutionalism .................................. 482
1. Untangling the Strands of Interpretation Theory ................. 482
2. The Second-Best Defense is a Good Offense .......................... 486
3. Incompletely Theorized Agreements ...................................... 487
4. The Deep Problem of the Constitutional Second Best .......... 489
5. Consequentialism versus Right Reason ................................. 489
III. MAKING THE ARETAIC TURN IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY ........... 491
A. The Aretaic Approach to Constitutional Theory ....................... 491
1. Law and Modern Moral Philosophy ....................................... 492
2. From Virtue Ethics to Virtue Jurisprudence ......................... 495
B. The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory .............................. 498
1. Thin and Thick Theories of Constitutional Virtue ................ 499
2. From Thick and Thin to Virtue-Centered .............................. 501
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIRTUES AND VICES ........................................... 502
A . Constitutional Vice ..................................................................... 502
B. Constitutional Virtue .................................................................. 507
C. The Virtue of Justice ................................................................... 512
1. The Centrality of Justice ......................................................... 512
2. Is Justice a Virtue? .................................... . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. 513
3. The Structure of the Virtue of Justice .................................... 515
D. A Preliminary Statement of the Theory .................................... 518
*© 2004 Lawrence B. Solum. Permission is hereby granted for
noncommercial reproduction of this article in whole or in part for educational or
research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use, subject
only to the condition that the name of the author, a full citation to the article, and this
copyright notice and grant of permission be included in the copies.
Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. I am grateful to
Rebecca Brown and Steve Smith for comments on prior versions of this essay.
475
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
E. Aretaic Constitutional Formalism ............................................. 520
V. THE ARETAIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE ...... 522
A. The Institutional Tu Quoque ..................................................... 524
1. Institutional Deficits and Second-Best Methodologies ......... 524
2. Institutional Deficits and Institutional Design ..................... 525
B. The Lesson of the Institutional Tu Quoque .............................. 530
C. The Path of the Law and the Road to Virtue ............................ 531
I. THE MOST DYSFUNCTIONAL BRANCH
The perennial questions of constitutional theory in the
United States have been: "Is judicial review justified?" and
"How should the constitution be interpreted?" These questions
can be approached from a variety of theoretical standpoints.
Ideal normative theory asks the enduring questions of
constitutional theory by assuming that institutions and
individuals will act as they should act. Nonideal theories relax
these idealizing assumptions and ask contextualized questions
such as the following: "How should the constitution be
interpreted by the judges who actually occupy the bench? Is
judicial review justified in current political circumstances?
How have the political branches actually responded to the
institution of judicial review?" In this Essay, I argue that
constitutional theory should respond to these questions by
taking a turn that is both new and old-an aretaic' turn rooted
in contemporary virtue jurisprudence2  and classical
republicanism.3
"Arbte" is the ancient Greek word for excellence. An aretaic moral theory
focuses on excellences and deficiencies of human character. An aretaic theory of
constitutional interpretation focuses on the excellences and deficiencies of officials,
characteristically judges, who engage in the practice of constitutional interpretation.
"Aretaic" is thus a synonym for "excellence focused." The Greek aretaic is frequently
translated as 'virtue" from "virtu," the standard Latin translation for "arbte." See
generally Aretaic Turn, Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aretaicturn (last
modified Oct. 5, 2004) ("In moral philosophy, the phrase aretaic turn refers to the
renewed emphasis on human excellence or virtue in moral theory and ethics.").
2 Prior work that is explicitly within "virtue jurisprudence" includes,
Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to
Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the
Rule of Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 120 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994);
Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=369940 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004) [hereinafter, Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence].
' Although virtue jurisprudence is rooted in classical moral and political
philosophy, its shape is conceptually distinct from the similarly rooted "republican
revival" in constitutional theory. See generally Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Symposium, Conceptions of Democracy: The Case of Voting
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I begin with a speculative hypothesis: the institution of
judicial review has incrementally but inexorably led to the
politicization of the Supreme Court, and this politicization has
led the political branches to exclude consideration of virtue
from the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court
Justices. Instead, political actors tend to select Justices on the
basis of the strength of their commitment to particular
positions on particular issues and the fervor of their ideological
passions. This has produced a court most notable for its vices.'
Indeed, I shall make the provocative claim that with few
exceptions, vice and not virtue has prevailed on the Court since
the New Deal. The Justices, of the right and of the left, are
most notable for what they lack, the virtue of justice.
This is a tragedy, and it has implications far beyond the
cases the court decides. The Supreme Court's elevation of
results over reasoning and politics over principle has inevitably
infected practical jurisprudence in courts high and low, state
and federal, liberal and conservative. As a working empirical
hypothesis, I suggest that the result poses a significant threat
to the rule of law. Because of the Supreme Court's prominent
role in our public political culture, its vices shape popular
understanding of the role of law. Judges can make law
indeterminate,' and when they do, the ability of the law to do
its jobs-to create ex ante predictability, to establish stable
expectations, and to provide neutral dispute resolution-is
undermined. If the Justices lack the virtue of justice, then we
should not be surprised if it is little valued by other courts, the
political branches, and the culture at large.
The theoretical framework that lies behind these claims
is "virtue jurisprudence." Expressed in the language of virtue
jurisprudence, the core claim of the Article is that
constitutional theory should make an aretaic turn-analagous
Rights, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 409 (1989); Symposium, Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of
Republican Theory in Modern Constitutional Theory, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
' The claim that the post-New Deal Supreme Court is notable for its vices is
controversial and its full substantiation would require an in-depth examination of
many particular decisions. On the one hand, the modern Court has vitiated the
Constitutional scheme of enumerated powers by a sweeping interpretation of the
Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). On the other hand, the
Court has sometimes seemed to engage in a results-oriented approach to disputes that
might have been thought beyond judicial competence, See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000). Demonstrating that these decisions, or any others, are truly the result of vice is,
of course, beyond the scope of this article.
' Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
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to the turn to virtue ethics in moral theory.' Writ large, virtue
jurisprudence is the view that the proper aim of legislation is
the promotion of human flourishing through creation of the
conditions for the development of human excellence-the
distinctively human virtues and vices. Another component of
virtue jurisprudence is a virtue-centered theory of judging-an
account of adjudication based on a theory of judicial excellence.
One of the advantages of a character-driven approach is the
way it responds to a fact that is intractable for many other
theories: there is no "decision procedure for judging"-no rule,
complex or simple, that, if diligently followed, would magically
produce the correct outcome in every case. Because the
complexity of the world outruns our ability to make rules,
excellence in judging requires practical wisdom. Excellent
constitutional adjudicators need legal vision-the ability to
discern the legally salient aspects of the case and to select the
doctrines and remedies that are appropriate.
The aretaic turn in constitutional theory has practical
implications. The process of judicial selection should prioritize
the nomination and confirmation of individuals who possess
the judicial virtues--courage, temperance, judicial
temperment, intelligence, and practical wisdom. Most
importantly, judges should be selected for their possession of
the virtue of justice-the disposition to decide according to law
and not to use their power to translate their own political and
policy agendas into constitutional doctrine.
The argument that leads to these conclusions begins, in
Part II, by engaging Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule's
recent Essay, Interpretation and Institutions.7 Sunstein and
Vermeule contend that theories of constitutional interpretation
are most fundamentally flawed because of their failure to take
an institutional turn, but their supporting arguments actually
lead to a related but quite distinct conclusion. Only a theory of
judicial character can supply the remedy for the ills that
Sunstein and Vermeule identify; constitutional theory must
take an aretaic turn. In Part III, I sketch an alternative
approach to judicial review and constitutional interpretation
that is rooted in contemporary virtue ethics. In Part IV, this
sketch is given flesh and bones in the form of a theory of
constitutional virtue and vice. In Part V, I return to
See infra Part III.A.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101
MiH. L. REv. 885 (2003).
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institutionalism as an approach to the theory of constitutional
interpretation and argue that institutionalists cannot
coherently refrain from making the aretaic turn. I end by
speculating about the possibility of a path to the restoration of
judicial virtue.
II. INSTITUTIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
This section begins by offering a very general account of
what it means to contextualize a constitutional theory. It then
proceeds to a detailed examination of Sunstein and Vermeule's
argument for a particular contextualizing strategy,
institutionalism. Finally, it takes a hard look at this argument
and exposes the ways in which Sunstein and Vermeule have
concealed assumptions about the crucial role of character in
constitutional theory.
A. The General Role of Context
Some theories of judicial review and constitutional
interpretation are acontextual. Constitutional theories
frequently focus on questions of ideal theory to the exclusion of
factors that may undermine (or enhance) a theory's practical
workability Of course, idealizing assumptions have an
important role to play in constitutional theory, as they do in
the natural sciences, economics, and elsewhere. But if an ideal
theory is offered as a guide to practice, then at some stage in
the full development of the theory the idealizations must give
way. To let go of idealizing assumptions requires
contextualization. We begin with an abstract constitutional
theory. We then consider that theory in the context of an
abstract institutional structure. We next situate the normative
theory and the abstract institutional structure in the historical
context of the causal forces that have influenced institutional
practice. Finally, we consider the particular circumstances in
'Sunstein and Vermeule emphasize the abstraction rather than
idealization. Id. at 885 (observing that 'interpretive issues are debated at a high level
of abstraction"). This formulation does not capture Sunstein and Vermeule's claims
well. First, interpretative theories are frequently debated through the use of concrete
examples. Second, all theories, including Sunstein and Vermeule's own views, are
abstract because they are theories. Thus, for the most part Sunstein and Vermeule
discuss "institutions" and "institutional capacities" in the abstract, with occasional use
of concrete examples.
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which we find ourselves here and now. As abstraction
decreases and contextualization increases, the complexity of
the theory grows and its ability to guide particular choices will
become dependant on empirical judgments that are frequently,
but not always, disputed or uncertain. Abstraction permits
generalization. Contextualization implies the priority of the
particular.
B. The Case for the Essential Role of Institutionalism
In their important and illuminating Essay,
Interpretation and Institutions, Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule argue that the prevailing approach to theories of
legal interpretation is fundamentally inadequate because it
fails to adequately integrate an account of the institutional
dimension." In particular, they argue that prevailing
approaches to legal interpretation fail for two reasons: (1) they
lack an account of institutional capacities;" and (2) they fail to
consider dynamic effects, e.g., the consequences of
Congressional reactions to how judges interpret texts in accord
with a particular theory." The content of these two arguments
can be illustrated by considering them in the specific context of
constitutional theory.
Although Sunstein and Vermeule aim their critique at
theories of legal interpretation in general, they single out
constitutional interpretation and the theory of judicial review"
9 Arguments about contextualization and idealization must proceed
cautiously in order to avoid the problem of double standards. It is all too easy to
criticize a theory on the ground that it is unrealistic. One identifies the idealizing
assumption, substitutes a factually realistic premise, and then shows that the
theoretical claims are no longer valid. But too often the critic then proposes an
alternative theory that rests on different, but still idealizing, assumptions. Thus, an
institutional critique of a constitutional theory demands that idealizing assumptions
about institutional capacities be relaxed, but this entails an obligation to build an
institutional alternative that observes real-world constraints.
"' Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7. But see Richard Posner, Reply: The
Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Intepretation, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 952 (2003) (arguing that Sunstein and Vermeule have ignored work that does
take institutional factors into account). Sunstein and Vermeule replied in Interpretive
Theory in Its Infancy: A Reply to Posner, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 972 (2003).
" Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 886 (arguing that the question for a
theory of legal interpretation should be "how should certain institutions, with their
distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret certain texts").
12 Id.
" Sunstein and Vermeule are careful to acknowledge the important strands
of constitutional theory that incorporate institutional considerations. They single out
for praise on this score James Bradley Thayer, id. at 936, Alexander Bickel, id.,
Lawrence Sager, id., Neil Komesar, id. at 937, Einer Elhauge, id., Jeremy Waldron, id.,
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as a particular example of the ill they have diagnosed in
constitutional theory, and identify Marbury v. Madison as a
particularly egregious example of institutional blindness:
[M]any of the most well-known arguments on behalf of judicial
review, including those in Marbury itself, are blind to institutional
considerations. They ignore the risk of judicial error and the
possibility of dynamic consequences. In American law, Chief Justice
John Marshall might even be deemed the father, or the founder, of
the kind of institutional blindness that we are criticizing.14
Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the case for judicial
review is based on assumptions about institutional capacities
that may well be untrue. For example, they write, "[I]t is easy
to imagine constitutional systems that would refuse to give
judges the power to strike down legislation. If judges are
corrupt, biased, poorly informed or otherwise unreliable, it
would hardly make sense to entrust them with that power.""
They also argue that the power of judicial review may have
dynamic effects or unintended consequences. For example,
suppose "that the power of judicial review would weaken the
attention paid by other institutions to constitutional
requirements-so that judicial review . . . would weaken the
grip of constitutional limitations on other branches.""
Their critique is not limited to Justice Marshall's
opinion in Marbury; it extends to contemporary theorists as
well, singling out Ronald Dworkin," Akil Amar,"8 and Lawrence
Lessig.19 For example, they fault Dworkin's use of philosophical
arguments about morality in "The Philosophers' Brief."' Before
courts should accept this kind of argument, Sunstein and
Vermeule argue, "it is necessary to ask about judicial
competence to evaluate moral arguments of this sort."21
Similarly, they criticize Akil Amar's insistence that the
constitution's text be read as a "coherent, integrated whole,"
because Amar does not consider the possibility that "real-world
Mark Tushnet, id., and Larry Karmer, id. at 937-38.
14 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 933 (arguing that John Marshall is
the parental unit of institutional blindness).
Id. at 935.1 Id. at 935.
17 See id. at 938.
See id.
' See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 938.
See id. at 938-40. The Philosopher's Brief is available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1237 and at http://cyber.law.harvard.edubridge/
Philosophy/philbrf.htm.
21 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7 at 939.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
judges charged with holistic interpretation will simply blunder,
producing a patter of incoherent outcomes, or, worse yet,
producing an internally coherent but morally misguided vision
of public law."2' Finally, Sunstein and Vermeule argue that
"Lessig fails to consider the possibility that judges might be
poor translators, garbling meanings so badly that a simple-
minded transliteration would preserve more of the original
than would an ambitious and mistaken attempt to capture the
original's real sense."'
A clear theme emerges from Sunstein and Vermeule's
criticisms of Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig. In each case, by
"institutional capacities," they refer to the capacities of the
individuals who occupy the role of judges. Judges may lack the
intellectual capability or the moral character necessary to carry
out the tasks demanded by particular theories of constitutional
interpretation. The unstated assumption of their argument is
that institutional analysis can fill this gap.
C. Scrutiny of the Case for Institutionalism
Sunstein and Vermeule are undoubtedly on to
something important. In this section I clarify their argument. I
begin by attempting to disentangle conceptually distinct
strands of interpretation theory.
1. Untangling the Strands of Interpretation Theory
What kinds of questions does a theory of interpretation
answer? What sorts of theories are theories of constitutional
interpretation? Until we answer these questions, it will not be
clear whether Sunstein and Vermeule are criticizing theorists
like Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig, or if they are simply changing
the subject. We might categorize theories of interpretation as
operating at three distinct levels: conceptual, substantive and
normative. Coherent discourse about theories of constitutional
interpretation requires that these three different levels be
clearly distinguished. Theories at level one make conceptual
claims about the nature of and necessary preconditions for
interpretation and understanding. Theories at level two make
hermeneutic claims about the meaning of particular texts.
Id. at 940 (citation omitted).
Id. at 942.
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Theories at level three make normative claims about practical
methodologies for constitutional interpretation.
Level One: Conceptual Theories of Interpretation. Some
theories of interpretation seek to answer questions like: "What
is interpretation?" and "How is it possible for a reader to
understand a text?" Han-Georg Gadamer's magnum opus,
Truth and Method,' addresses this kind of question as does
Donald Davidson's work on interpretation." As applied to
constitutional theory, the questions are: "What is constitutional
interpretation?" "What does it mean to say that one has an
'interpretation' of a constitution?" "How is it possible for
contemporary readers to understand the meaning of the
Constitution?" "What are the requirements for understanding a
legal text?" An answer to questions like these might begin: "We
are able to understand the constitution because we are linked
to it by a continuous tradition" or "We are able to
understanding the meaning of particular parts of the
Constitution by placing them in the context of the whole
document."
Level Two: Substantive Theories of the Meaning of
Particular Texts. What does the United States Constitution
mean? Some theories of constitutional interpretation are aimed
squarely at the meaning of particular constitutions. Such
theories can be developed in a number of ways, ranging from
the relatively abstract theory of textualism to very concrete
and particular theories based on constitutional history. Thus,
one might assert that the meaning of the United States
Constitution is equivalent to the plain meaning of the text of
each clause of the constitution. Or one might assert that the
meaning of the United States Constitution is that it is a
2 HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 265-66 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989) (describing the hermeneutic circle, whereby
each part is understood in light of the whole and vice versa, as a view about how
understanding is possible as distinguished from a method of interpretation).
See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND
INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2001). Davidson and Gadamer, although working within very
different philosophical traditions, both argue that truth is the key to interpretation. As
Davidson put it:
This method is intended to solve the problem of the interdependence of belief
and meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible while solving for
meaning. This is accomplished by assigning truth conditions to alien
sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly possible,
according, of course to our own view of what is right.
Id. at 137. See also Biography of Donald Davidson, The Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/davidson.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2004).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
charter of liberty preserving the maximum possible freedom of
each individual." Alternatively, one might say, the meaning of
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is
that each citizen has an individual right to own and practice
the use of weapons of the type that would be used by foot
soldiers in a war.
Level Three: Normative Theories of Interpretive
Methodology. Finally, there are theories that prescribe
particular methodologies for judicial interpretation of the
constitution. Such theories address questions like the
following: "What interpretive rules or techniques will be enable
judges to render decisions that accord with the true meaning of
the constitution?" or "What interpretive methodologies will
produce the best social consequences?" or "What rules of thumb
are most likely to reduce judicial error in interpreting the
Constitution?" We can further distinguish between two
varieties of normative theory. Ideal Normative Theories ask
these questions from the point of view of ideal theory, i.e. on
the basis of the assumption of perfect compliance with the
theory. Nonideal Normative Theories address the same
questions from a different perspective, i.e. on the basis of the
capacities and attitudes of real-world judges and other
interpreters.
In order to avoid confusion, discussion about theories of
constitutional interpretation must distinguish the three levels
clearly. Conceptual claims about the nature of and necessary
preconditions for interpretation are distinct from claims about
the meaning of particular texts. And claims of these two types
are different from normative claims about practical
methodologies for constitutional interpretation.
The distinction between the three levels can be
illuminated by an analogy between constitutional
interpretation and the art of archery. A level one theory of
archery tells us that archery involves a target, a bow and
arrows, and that the aim of any particular archery contest is to
hit the target. A level two theory of archery tells us where the
target is located for a particular contest (e.g., that round
canvas-there-with the red bull's eye-that is the target). A
level three theory of archery tells archers how to hit the
"See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING TBE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 253-69 (2004).
[Vol. 70:2
2004-051 THE ARETAIC TURN IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 485
target-hold the bow like this, notch the arrow thus and so,
aim in such and such a manner.
One of the difficulties with Sunstein and Vermeule's
arguments is that, with an important exception, they conflate
these conceptual levels. For the most part, Sunstein and
Vermeule simply assume that theories of constitutional
interpretation all operate at the third level; that is, they
assume that Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig all are proposing
normative theories of interpretive technique. By way of
analogy, they assume that Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig are
offering judges instructions in practical archery. This
assumption is implicit in the criticisms that Sunstein and
Vermeule make, which are aimed at the use of the theories as
practical interpretive methods.
But is this assumption correct? Even a cursory
examination of the question points in the direction of "no." The
constitutional theories that Sunstein and Vermeule are
attacking may be ambiguous, operating at all three levels to
some extent, but all three theorists tend to bounce between
level one and level two. That is, Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig
make arguments about the nature of interpretation and
meaning, and then use those arguments to construct views
about what the United States Constitution actually means, in
both abstract and particular contexts.
Let me illustrate this claim by reference to Dworkin's
judge, Hercules, who is able to construct the theory that best
fits and justifies the law as a whole to decide each particular
case." Now, if Dworkin were offering a level three theory, he
would quite obviously have done a very bad job indeed. If each
judge undertook the Herculean task of constructing the theory
that best justifies the law as a whole each time a particular
issue of law came up, then judges would run into severe
problems. Most obviously, no cases would ever be decided in a
timely fashion, as the judge was snagged in the seamless web
of the law. Laying this problem aside, it is not clear that any
judges actually have the ability to construct such a theory. But
this should make us suspicious of the premise that Dworkin is
offering a level three theory. A more plausible interpretation is
that Hercules is a heuristic device, the purpose of which is to
lay bare the general structure of legal interpretation. That is,
" See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
379-99 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE].
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the fictional figure of Hercules is used to develop a conceptual
theory about the nature of legal interpretation. Dworkin then
uses this theory to support further claims at level two, i.e.
claims about what the United States Constitution actually
means. 8 An institutional critique that assumes that Dworkin
offered Hercules only as a fictional role-model makes a category
mistake.
2. The Second-Best Defense is a Good Offense
When I argued that Sunstein and Vermeule conflated
the three levels of interpretation theory, I conceded there was
one important exception. In Part II of Interpretation and
Institutions, they consider the possibility that non-institutional
theories of constitutional interpretation may be necessary
because they specify what counts as the correct outcome in
constitutional interpretation.' Although Sunstein and
Vermeule do not employ my terminology or conceptual
mapping, we might say that they recognize that some of the
theories they critique operate at level two, i.e. as theories of
constitutional meaning, or in other words as descriptions of the
particular target at which constitutional interpreters should
aim.
In response to this objection, Sunstein and Vermeule
offer what they call a "minimal response."30 This response
distinguishes between "first-best" and "second-best,"3 drawing
on the familiar distinction from economic theory.' The very
general idea of the theory of the second best can be expressed
as follows. Assume a system with multiple variables. Take the
most desirable state the whole system could assume and the
associated values that all of the variables must assume to
produce this state: call this condition, the first-best state of the
system and call the associated values of the variables, the first-
best values. Now assumre that one variable will not assume the
value necessary for tihe first-best state of the whole system: call
See generally RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 914.
so Id.
31 Id.
See, e.g., R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (articulating theory of second best in economics).
See also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 011: Second Best (Nov. 23, 2003), at
http:/Ilegaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003 1-_01_legaltheorylexicon-archive.html#10
6961201321647437 (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
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this the constrained variable. Next take the next to the most
desirable state the whole system could assume and the
associated values that all the variables must assume to
produce this state: call this the second-best state of the system.
There are systems in which achieving the second-best state will
require that at least one variable other than the constrained
variable assume a value other than the first-best value: call the
value the second-best value. One expects that there are
examples where many or even all variables must assume
second-best values. Sunstein and Vermeule are arguing that
theories of constitutional interpretation ignore institutional
capacities as a constraining variable. In particular, judicial
capacity may not be able to assume the value required by the
first-best theory of constitutional interpretation. Therefore,
another variable, i.e. the normative theory of interpretive
methodology must assume a second-best value in order to
produce the second-best state of the system of constitutional
interpretation. In other words, if the judiciary lacks the
institutional capacity to do what Dworkin, Amar, or Lessig's
first-best theory requires, then an institutional theory is
required in order to produce second-best outcomes. For this
reason, "institutional analysis is necessary, even if not
sufficient, to an adequate evaluation of interpretive methods.'
3. Incompletely Theorized Agreements
Sunstein and Vermeule then argue that a "second-best
assessment of institutional issues might, in some cases, be not
only necessary but indeed sufficient to resolve conflicts over
interpretive theories . .. ." What Sunstein and Vermeule mean
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 915.
Id. Notice the subtle difference in wording: "an adequate evaluation" in the
quote accompanying note 33, versus "to resolve conflicts" in the text accompanying this
note. This subtle difference is actually crucial to Sunstein & Vermeule's claims. An
institutional theory is necessary to know whether a given first-best theory will work in
practice, but is not sufficient for that purpose. An institutional theory may be sufficient
to resolve conflicts over interpretive theories, but not necessary for that purpose.
Suppose Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig all have first-best level one theories about the
nature of meaning that produce level two results in the form of claims about what the
U.S. Constitution means. Let us suppose counterfactually that Dworkin, Amar, and
Lessig each believe that their level one theories should be used as level three
methodologies.
Consider first necessity. Evaluation of Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig's
theories require institutional analysis, because we need to know whether judges have
the capacities to produce the level two meanings using the level three methods. But
institutional analysis is not necessary to resolve conflicts between our three theorists.
First, the conflict may be irresolvable; they may not be able to agree on the appropriate
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is that it is possible that theorists whose views differ at levels
one and two (i.e. they have different views of the nature of
interpretation and the meaning of the constitution) might
converge at level three, once they take institutional problems
into account. The different theorists would agree on a
methodology (perhaps clause bound textualism), but that
agreement would be incompletely theorized because each
theorist would provide a different theoretical foundation for the
methodology.
The reader may immediately be struck by the intuition
that Sunstein and Vermeule are overly optimistic. Of course, it
will depend on the particular theorists. For example, if the
theorists who are to come to an incompletely theorized
agreement find themselves disagreeing at level one but in
substantial agreement at level two, then, given institutional
limitations, they might converge at level three. That is, if they
agree on what the constitution means, but have different
theories as to why it means that, then they might well agree on
a set of interpretive methods that approximate the agreed-upon
meaning. But suppose we have theorists who disagree at both
level one and level two. Then it seems unlikely they will agree
at level three. To take a tried and true example, if two theorists
disagree about the constitutional right to privacy, then it is
most unlikely that they will agree on a simple methodology
such as clause-bound textualism or some simple form of
originalism. Constitutional theorists who disagree about what
the constitution means are like archery instructors who
disagree about the nature and location of the target. Although
methods. Second, they may be able to agree on the appropriate methods without
engaging in institutional analysis. For example, Lessig might convince Dworkin and
Amar that his level one and two views are correct. Perhaps Dworkin could convince
Amar and Lessig that their theories, despite surface structure differences, are really
the same as his theory in their deep structures.
Consider second sufficiency. An institutional theory is not sufficient to
determine whether a given theory of constitutional interpretation will work in practice.
This is obvious because the practical workability of a theory requires that the theory be
worked out; institutional analysis cannot, by itself, tell us anything about whether a
particular theory is viable. An institutional theory may be sufficient to resolve conflicts
over interpretive theories, but this will, of course, depend on the particular
constellation of theories. One can easily imagine that Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig are
unable to reach agreement, despite institutional analysis. For example, Dworkin might
insist that "the law is a seamless web," while Lessig might deny that premise. This
theoretical disagreement might lead Dworkin and Lessig to disagree about the
question of whether judges in constitutional cases should seek constitutional
interpretations that cohere with the general topology of the common law and statutory
law.
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they might converge on how best to grip the bow, they will
surely not agree on where their archers should aim.
4. The Deep Problem of the Constitutional Second Best
There is another, deeper, problem with Sunstein and
Vermeule's claim that an institutionally grounded, second-best
(or nonideal) level-three theory is sufficient to resolve
theoretical first-best disagreement. The first-best theory is
actually necessary for agreement to be reached. Each theorist
relies on her first-best theory to make the judgment about what
is second-best. Without the normative components of first-best
theories, there would be no criteria for what the second-best
state of the system is. Put another way: level three judgments
about second-best normative theories of interpretive
methodologies presuppose level two judgments about first-best
constitutional meanings. This is an obvious point, and surely
Sunstein and Vermeule must have recognized it. Perhaps they
simply mean that first-best theories need not be part of
articulated reasons for decisions. Rather, the first-best theories
would lurk in the background as the criteria to be employed by
legal analysts who reflect on interpretive methodologies
employed by judges and other officials.
5. Consequentialism versus Right Reason
Finally, Sunstein and Vermeule's views rest on a
controversial assumption about political morality. We might
call this a consequentialist assumption about the role of
reasons for action: the assumption is that it is only the
outcomes of judicial practice that count in evaluation. This
assumption has a corollary: if judges make the decision that
will lead to the best-available outcome (i.e. the second-best
state of the system), then the fact that they reached that
decision for the wrong reasons is not relevant to (or perhaps,
does not bear decisively on) the question whether they have
acted rightly.
But this assumption is hugely controversial. Many
important views about morality assert that right action is
action on the basis of right reason. It is not enough to hit the
target by accident; one must be aiming at the right target to act
rightly. This abstract point can be made more concrete by
considering examples. I want to take an extreme example first,
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
and then consider an example that is close to the spirit of
Sunstein and Vermeule's articulation of their position.
The Bribery Example. Suppose it were possible to
produce the second-best outcome through a systemic practice of
bribing judges. For example, suppose that the first-best
interpretation of the constitution is that the constitution is a
charter for economic efficiency and personal liberty, and that
bribery can create a market for efficient, liberty-enhancing
judicial decisions. Judges need not aim at getting cases right.
Rather, they can approximate the correct outcomes by
auctioning their decision to the highest briber. But this would
be an abhorrent system of judging, even if did produce the
second-best outcomes, in the sense that they best approximated
the outcomes that judges with idealized institutional capacities
would reach. A corrupt decision is not rendered virtuous
because the outcome was the same as the outcome of a virtuous
decision. Reasons count.
The Clause-Bound Textualism Example. Now consider
the possibility that judges adopt clause-bound textualism as
their practical decision-making strategy. A particular judge
says to himself:
The constitution really means X (where X could be the original
meaning as understood by the ratifiers, the holistic meaning of the
clause in the context of the entire constitution, or something else),
but I shall not aim at X. Instead, I shall decide the case before me on
the basis of the literal meaning of the particular clause considered in
isolation. Even though I know that getting the constitution right
would require me to examine the meaning of the whole document, I
will not do this, because I am likely to screw it up. Therefore, I will
make a decision which I know is wrong.
Setting aside the difficulties a judge might have taking up such
an attitude, the question arises whether they can possibly act
rightly if they decide in this way. For many moraltheorists, the
answer to this question is "no."
Consider then, an alternative. Suppose our judge were
to reason as follows:
I should aim at deciding the case in accord with the true meaning of
the constitution, M, which is specified by theory X (holism,
originalism, or whatever theory the judge believes to be correct).
However, I should recognize that I have limited institutional
capabilities to determine M. I have limited time. I am smart, but I
am not Justice Holmes or Judge Posner. I am knowledgeable about
many areas of the law, but there are gaps in my knowledge.
Therefore, I should take these limitations into account as I attempt
to determine M. For example, if my research reveals a surprising
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piece of history that would fundamentally alter constitutional
doctrine, I should be humble and assume that the conventional
wisdom is probably more likely correct than my new-found discovery,
unless I am very, very sure of myself.
There is an obvious difference between the two judges. The
first judge aims at the wrong decision. The second judge aims
at the right decision. As a practical matter, they may reach the
same outcomes, but the second judge will reach the outcome for
good reasons. To consequentialists, there is no important
difference between the two judges except insofar as their
differences reliably produce better or worse expected
consequences. To many moral theorists and ordinary citizens,
however, this difference is critical.
At this point, my presentation and assessment of
Sunstein and Vermeule's views is complete and we can make
what I shall call the aretaic turn. What are the implications for
institutionalism of a theory of judicial excellence or virtue?
III. MAKING THE ARETAiC TURN IN CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY
Sunstein and Vermeule's critique focuses on the
abilities of judges to live up to first-best theories of
constitutional interpretation. They connect this critique to
institutions. In this section, I argue that the focus on judges'
abilities is on target, but that institutions are only part of the
story and not the most important place to start. Instead, we
first need to ask the question, "What makes judges excellent?"
Once this question is on the table, it raises issues that require
a conceptual reformulation of the problems that Sunstein and
Vermeule address.
A. The Aretaic Approach to Constitutional Theory
The aretaic turn begins with a brief introduction to
virtue jurisprudence, the normative and explanatory theory of
law that builds on the insights of contemporary virtue ethics.
My exposition of this theory begins by briefly comparing
contemporary legal theory with modern moral philosophy as it
was situated in the 1950s.
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1. Law and Modern Moral Philosophy
In Modern Moral Philosophy, Elizabeth Anscombe
famously noted persistent problems with the deontological and
utilitarian approaches that dominated normative ethics when
she wrote in 1958.' Modern legal theory has strong connections
with modern moral philosophy. Historically, the connection is
evident in the work of Jeremy Bentham, who combined a
conceptual separation of law and morality with a utilitarian
program of legal reform." Contemporary legal scholarship
frequently invokes general moral theories, including
preference-satisfaction utilitarianism" and deontological
theories like Kant's,' to make arguments about what the law
should be. Such normative legal theories are addressed to
lawmakers (in the broad sense), including legislators and
adjudicators. Developments in political philosophy, sparked by
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice3" and its libertarian' and
' G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in VIRTUE ETHICS: OXFORD
READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY, first page of article, 26-44 (originally 33 PHILOSOPHY
(1958)), reprinted in RELIGION, ETHICS, AND POLITICS, 3 THE COLLECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF G. E. M. ANSCOMBE (1981), and in ETHICS (Judith
Thompson & Gerald Dworkin eds., 1968).
See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J. H.
Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1988); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J. H. Burns et al. eds., 1996).
"7 Preference satisfaction utilitarianism provides the moral foundation for
most of normative law and economics. For a general statement, see LOUIS KAPLOW &
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
' See, e.g., David C. Bricker, A Kantian Argument for Native American
Cultural Survival, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 789, 789-790 (1999); Alice Haemmerli,
Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 390 (1999);
Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1373, 1388 (1992); Richard B. Lillich, Kant and the Current Debate Over
Humanitarian Intervention, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 397, 397-404 (1997); R. George
Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian
Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 272-73 (2002). See also Symposium, Kantian Legal
Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1987) (collection of articles on Kant and law).
' Use of Rawls's theory in general and the original position in various forms
has become commonplace in legal scholarship. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) (bankruptcy law); Wendy J. Gordon, An
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, And
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1426 (1989) (intellectual property law);
Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (tort
law). See also Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
549 (1994) (discussing use of Rawls in legal scholarship and judicial opinions).
The contemporary libertarian classic is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1977). For applications in legal scholarship, see, e.g., Donna M. Byrne,
Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 771-89 (1995); Joseph H. Carens,
Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251, 251-59 (1987); Frank
J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH.
J. INTL L. 975, 1007-08 (2000). An influential libertarian theory of law is offered in
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communitarian 4' critics, have met with avid attention from the
legal academy.
There is, however, an exception to the general rule that
contemporary legal theory reflects developments in modern
moral and political philosophy. Legal theory (as practiced by
philosophers or academic lawyers) has paid scant attention to
one of the most significant developments in moral theory in the
second half of the twentieth century, the emergence of virtue
ethics.4 ' An outpouring of articles and monographs attests to
the interest of philosophers in aretaic moral theory.43 In the
law, the situation has been different. The hegemony of
deontological and utilitarian theories prevails, at least among
legal theorists working in the common-law tradition.4 There
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 63-64 (1998). See also James E.
Fleming, The Parsimony of Libertarianism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 171 (2000)
(discussing Barnett); Lawrence B. Solum, The Foundations of Liberty, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1780 (1999) (discussing Barnett).
" One prominent communitarian critique is found in MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998). For discussions by legal
academics, see, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 895, 895-96
(1985); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1886 (2001); Kevin P. Quinn, S.J., Viewing
Health Care as a Common Good: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277, 317-19 (2000).
4 The literature on virtue ethics is now vast. My own work has been
especially influenced by the following contemporary works: PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL
GOODNESS (2001) [hereinafter FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS]; PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES
AND VICES (1978) [hereinafter FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES]; ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON
VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (1981); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF
VIRTUE (1989); CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC VIEW (2003). See
also VIRTUE ETHICS: OXFORD READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote
eds., 1997); VIRTUE ETHICS: A CRITICAL READER (Daniel Statman ed., 1997); HOW
SHOULD ONE LIVE?: ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES (Roger Crisp ed., 1996).
4" See supra note 39. See also, e.g., Arthur Fleming, Reviewing the Virtues, 90
ETHICS 587 (1980); Gregory Pence, Recent Work on the Virtues, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 281
(1984); Greg Pence, Virtue Theory, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 249 (Peter Singer ed.,
1991); Marcia Baron, Varieties of Ethics of Virtue, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 47 (1985); Gregory
Trianosky, What Is Virtue Ethics All About?, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 335 (1990); Phillip
Montague, Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 53 (1992). On the
history of virtue ethics, see Richard White, Historical Perspectives on the Morality of
Virtue, 25 J. VALUE INQUIRY 217, 219-23 (1991).
For a particularly self-conscious choice to discuss deontology and
utilitarianism at the expense of virtue ethics, see Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral
Principle in the Law ofInsider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 381 & n.20 (1999):
For the purposes of this Article, we identify utilitarianism as the main
normative alternative to deontological theory. We do so for two reasons. First,
proponents of economic analysis, the dominant approach to insider trading,
often regard utilitarianism as the moral foundation of economic analysis....
Second, utilitarianism has historically been perceived as the strongest
competitor to deontology .... Because of considerations of space, we have had
to make some editorial choices about moral theories we discuss and to omit
discussions of theories other than deontology and utilitarianism. We intend
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are, however, a growing number of exceptions to this
hegemony, 5 including work on antitrust law,"6 bioethics," civil
rights law,"8 corporate law,'9 criminal law,' employment law,"
environmental law,2 terrorism law and policy,' torts,' legal
no slight to virtue ethics, moral development theory, social contract theory, or
any of the other moral theories we do not discuss.
Id. at 381.
See, e.g., Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Moral Issues and the Virtuous Judge:
Reflections on the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 35 CATH.
LAW. 311, 313 (1994); Donald F. Brosnan, Virtue Ethics in a Perfectionist Theory of
Law and Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 338 (1989); Miriam Galston, Taking
Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of
Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329, 331, 338 (1994); J. L. A. Garcia, Topics in
the New Natural Law Theory, 46 AM. J. JuRIS. 51, 62-63 (2001); Steven J. Heyman,
Aristotle on Political Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 851, 852 (1992); Linda R. Hirschman,
The Book of 'A, 70 TEX. L. REV. 971, 972 (1992); Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of
Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV. 983, 998 (1990); Kyron
Huigens, Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 563, 563 (2003);
Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 800 (2003).
" See, e.g., Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust
Regulation, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 741 (2000).
See, e.g., Shawn E. Peterson, A Comprehensive National Policy to Stop
Human Cloning: An Analysis of the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 with
Recommendations for Federal and State Legislatures, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 217, 261-62 (2003).
48 See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, S.J., Justice as Right Relationship: A
Philosophical and Theological Reflection on Affirmative Action, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 377,
433-34 (2002).
"9 See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary
Thoughts on Civility, Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 113,
116 (1995); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
856, 858 & 890 (1997); Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, No More Quandries: A Look at Virtue
Through the Eyes of Robert Solomon, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 117, 119-24 (1996); Jeffrey
Nesteruk, The Moral Dynamics of Law in Business, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 133, 135-37
(1996); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Law, Virtue and the Corporation, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 473, 473-
75 (1996).
60 See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1423,
1473-76 (1995); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 943, 943 (2000) (explaining criminal fault generally in virtue ethics
terms); Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1196
(2000) (dealing with death sentencing in virtue ethics terms); Kyron Huigens, Virtue
and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 431, 432-36 (1998); Kyron Huigens,
Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387 (2002); Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of
Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 288, 290 (1993); Christopher
Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 31 (2003); Donald A.
Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of
Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1430-31 (2003); Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests
in Criminal Law, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2002).
"1 See, e.g., Alison M. Sulentic, Happiness and ERISA: Reflections on the
Lessons of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for Sponsors of Employee Benefit Plans, 5
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMp. POL'Y J. 7 (2001).
' See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral
Relationship to Future Generations: Future Rights and Present Value, 24 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 249, 251-52 (1999); Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental
Policy: Moving Past Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543, 547-48 (1999).
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ethics,55 military justice,"6 pedagogy, 7 and public interest law.6M
Legal theory has begun, at least tentatively, to make the
aretaic turn, moving away from a myopic focus on either moral
rules or the calculation of consequences to a broader conception
of normativity that focuses on human excellence.
2. From Virtue Ethics to Virtue Jurisprudence
A full account of the implications of virtue ethics for
legal theory is a very large topic. Normative law and economics
is modeled on utilitarian moral theory. Rights-based legal
theories are modeled on deontological moral theories. Likewise,
virtue jurisprudence is modeled on contemporary virtue ethics.
As a comprehensive legal theory, virtue jurisprudence
addresses the full range of normative legal questions, ranging
from the proper end of legislation to the normative theory of
judging. Moreover, because virtue jurisprudence is embedded
in a larger aretaic enterprise-including virtue ethics, virtue
See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1227, 1245-56 (2002).
' See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue
Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2000). See also Kenneth W.
Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing
Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 933-34 (2001).
' See, e.g., Robert Araujo, S.J., The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and
Possibility, 50 SMU L. REV. 433, 434 (1997); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in
the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of
Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 305, 305 (2000); Robert F. Cochran,
Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS.
L. REV. 327, 328 (1998); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 707, 708 (1996); Heidi Li Feldman, Beyond the Model Rules: The Place of
Examples in Legal Ethics, 12 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 409 (1999); Heidi Li Feldman,
Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
885, 908-09 (1996); James W. Perkins, Virtues and the Lawyer, 38 CATH. LAW. 185, 187
(1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule Against Vouching for Clients:
Advocacy and 'The Manner That Is The Man Himself, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 145, 146 (1993); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal
Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 511-32 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (1999).
See, e.g., Major Walter M. Hudson, Book Review, Obeying Orders: Atrocity,
Military Discipline and the Law of War, 161 MI. L. REV. 225 (1999); Mark J. Osiel,
Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939,
1115 (1998).
" See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About
Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 259-60 (1998); Linda R.
Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues of the
Ruler, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1905, 1923-32 (1993).
"s See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Acting 'A Very Moral Type of God'. Triage
Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999).
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politics, and virtue epistemology-the whole story about virtue
jurisprudence is a long one indeed.
So we need to take a shortcut. For the sake of argument,
let us assume that there is something to virtue ethics. We can
then ask the very interesting question, "If virtue ethics were
sound, what would the implications for constitutional theory
be?" 9
The first step towards answering the implications
question is to distinguish virtue ethics from rival approaches to
moral theory. One way to see how virtue ethics is different
from deontology and consequentialism is to attend to the
distinctive foci of virtue ethics. Consequentialism focuses on
states of affairs; actions are right insofar as they produce
valuable states of affairs. Deontology focuses on actions;
actions are right insofar as they conform to the principles of
right action-a system of rights and duties. Virtue ethics
focuses on character; actions are right insofar as they would be
performed by a person of excellent character.' These different
foci correspond to differences in ways that deontology,
consequentialism, and virtue ethics conceive of the primary
aim of morality. For consequentialism, the aim is to produce
the best possible state of affairs. For deontology, the aim is
right action. For virtue ethics, the aim is excellence of human
character.
Virtue ethics is distinctive in another way. Both
deontology and consequentialism claim to provide a decision
procedure for ethics. An example of a deontological decision
procedure is Kant's formulation of the "categorical imperative":
act so that the maxim of your action could be willed as a
universal law of nature. "Act utilitarianism"- taking actions
that produce the greatest utility as compared to the available
alternatives-is an example of a consequentialist decision
procedure. Deontologists and consequentialists agree that
" If the case for virtue ethics is compelling, then there will be prima facie
reasons to believe that virtue jurisprudence is plausible as well. But this creates a bit
of a sticky wicket for this Essay. The philosophical case for virtue ethics is complex,
resting both on metaethical considerations and on arguments within normative ethics.
That case might be summarized in a long law review article, but it surely cannot be
summarized in a few pages. So rather than presenting the arguments, we might
instead observe their traces in the sociology of professional moral philosophy.
Conferences, monographs, anthologies, and encyclopedia articles testify to the
seriousness with which philosophers take contemporary virtue ethics. From the point
of view of legal theory, we might proceed as follows.
' Excellence in judicial character is specified by an account of judicial virtue
and vice. See infra Parts III.B.1 & IV.
[Vol. 70:2
2004-05] THE ARETAIC TURN IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 497
there is a rule that-at least in principle-provides a sure
guide to right action in every circumstance. Virtue ethics
denies this premise. The complexity of the world outruns the
capacity of any set of moral rules, or so the virtue ethicist
maintains. Right action requires what we might call "moral
vision"-the ability to perceive the morally salient aspects of
particular situations.
There are many possible virtue ethics," but historically,
one of the most important and influential varieties of virtue
ethics is associated with Aristotle. For Aristotle, the highest
achievable human good is eudemonia (roughly translated as
happiness), which consists in a life of activity in accord with
the human excellences (or virtues). 2 Aristotle divided the
virtues into two categories. The intellectual virtues were sophia
(theoretical wisdom) and phronesis (practical wisdom). The
moral virtues included courage, temperance, good temper, and
justice. Importantly, Aristotle argued that the moral virtues
can be conceptualized as the mean between two opposing
character deficiencies with respect to a morally neutral
emotion. Courage, for example, is a mean between the opposing
vices of cowardice and rashness; the morally neutral emotion is
fear. Cowards are disposed to fear too much; those who are
rash are insufficiently sensitive to danger and fear too little.
The courageous human is disposed to fear that is proportionate
to the situation.
Contemporary virtue ethics extends and develops the
Aristotelian framework. Beginning with the pioneering work of
Philippa Footr and Peter Geach and extending through recent
articulations by Rosalind Hursthouse, Nancy Sherman,'
Michael Slote,"7 and Christine Swanton,' among others,
contemporary virtue ethics has joined consequentialism and
deontology as one of the three main families of contemporary
ethical theory. Among the key ideas of contemporary virtue
" For example, Michael Slote has developed a distinctly Humean approach to
virtue ethics. See MICHAEL SLOTE, MORALS FROM MOTIVES (2001).
62 My understanding of Aristotle's ethics has been strongly influenced by
Gavin Lawrence. See Gavin Lawrence, Aristotle and the Ideal Life, 102 PHIL. REV. 1
(1993).
See FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS, supra note 42; FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES,
supra note 42.
See PETER GEACH, THE VIRTUES: THE STANTON LECTURES 1973-4 (1977).
' See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 42.
6' See SHERMAN, supra note 42.
67 See SLOTE, supra note 61.
68 See SWANTON, supra note 42.
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ethics is Rosalind Hursthouse's suggestion that virtue ethics
can guide action-to the extent that guidance is possible and
desirable-by adopting the principle that an action is right if
and only if the action would characteristically be performed by
a virtuous agent under the circumstances.
The move from virtue ethics to virtue jurisprudence is
simply the translation of the aretaic turn in moral theory to the
context of lawmaking and adjudication. For example, virtue
jurisprudence postulates that the proper aim of legislation is
the promotion of human flourishing through creation of the
conditions for the development of human excellence. Virtue
jurisprudence also provides a distinctive approach to the theory
of judging. Like virtue ethics, virtue jurisprudence begins by
arguing against the assumption that there is a single "decision
procedure for judging"-some rule that would guarantee the
correct outcome in every single case. Just as the world is more
complex than any set of moral rules, so too, the complex facts of
particular cases can outrun the capacities of any single uniform
decision procedure for judging. Discerning the right approach
to the particular case may require the judges to possess legal
vision-the ability to discern the legally salient aspects of the
case and to select the doctrines and remedies that are
appropriate.
B. The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory
I shall now turn from virtue jurisprudence in general to
an aretaic theory of constitutional interpretation in particular.
Let us begin with a brief overview of the implications of the
aretaic turn for ideal and nonideal theories of constitutional
interpretation. As a matter of ideal theory, the aretaic
approach to constitutional interpretation focuses on the
decisions that would be made by a virtuous judge. In response
to the question of ideal theory-"How in principle should
judges decide the constitutional controversies that are
presented to them?"-a virtue- centered theory of judging gives
an aretaic answer-judges should decide constitutional cases in
accord with the judicial virtues.
When it comes to nonideal theory, virtue jurisprudence
offers a set of practical recommendations. First and foremost,
the process of judicial selection should prioritize the
nomination and confirmation of individuals who possess the
judicial virtues. Second, programs of judicial education should
aim to cultivate these virtues in those who are already judges.
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Third, judges who lack the full array of judicial virtue should
aim to emulate the decisions of excellent judges when they can
and exemplify the virtue of judicial humility when they cannot.
Fourth, especially vicious judges-those who are corrupt or
incompetent-should be removed from office.
In this part, I lay out the bare bones of a virtue-centered
theory of constitutional adjudication. I shall begin with the
uncontroversial idea of a "thin theory of judicial virtue" and
then move to the idea of a virtue-centered approach to
interpreting the Constitution. Before I begin, let's adopt the
following terminology. We have been calling the virtues of
judges, "judicial virtues." Let us put to one side the question
whether constitutional cases require special virtues that are
not required for judging in general. From this point forward, I
shall occasionally use the phrase "constitutional virtue" to refer
to the excellences appropriate to the judge deciding a
constitutional case. When I refer to a "thin theory" of judicial
virtue, I mean that the theory is "thin" in the sense that it
makes few assumptions and those that it does make are
noncontroversial; by way of contrast, a thick theory rests on
more and more controversial assumptions.
1. Thin and Thick Theories of Constitutional Virtue
There is a sense in which the notion of constitutional
virtue is unlikely to be controversial for constitutional
theorists. For any given normative theory of constitutional
adjudication, there is a corresponding account of the qualities
that make for a good judge in a constitutional case. If we are
permissive in our criteria for the qualities that we are willing
to call "virtues" or "excellences," then we can offer accounts of
constitutional virtues that correspond to almost any theory of
constitutional interpretation.
Ronald Dworkin's theory of law as integrity provides an
exemplar, both of a general theory of judging and of a theory of
constitutional interpretation. As we have already seen,'
Dworkin believes that judges should decide cases in accordance
with the normative theory of law that best fits and justifies the
law as a whole. For judges to be able to do this reliably, they
will need to possess certain character traits that are
appropriate to the social role of a judge in a constitutional case.
6 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 27, at 105-30;
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 27, at 379-99.
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On Dworkin's theory, for example, the intellectual virtue of
theoretical wisdom is clearly a prerequisite for excellence in
constitutional adjudication. Dworkin's imaginary judge,
Hercules, decides cases by constructing the theory that fits and
justifies the law as a whole; this task can only be accomplished
by someone who is able to appreciate legal complexity and to
see the subtle interconnections between various legal doctrines
summarized in the slogan, "the law is a seamless web."
Different normative theories of constitutional
interpretation may result in different lists of the excellences
that are appropriate to judges in constitutional cases.
Originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, for
example, may place special emphasis on the ability to
understand historical materials and take up the perspective of
citizens in the founding era-excellence as a judicial historian.
Welfarist theories of constitutional interpretation might
emphasize the ability to engage in economic analysis of legal
rules and to make legislative findings of fact-excellence as a
judicial economist. A contemporary ratification theory could
prioritize the ability to discern contemporary values and
commitments that undergird current acceptance of the
constitution-excellence as a judicial sociologist.
Suppose that it were the case that some qualities of
judicial character are necessary for reliably good judging given
any plausible normative theory of judicial decision-making. If
this were so, then an account of these qualities would be what I
shall call a "thin" theory of judicial virtue. On this picture, the
judicial virtues are simply those qualities of character that are
required to realize one's conception of good judging, whatever
that might happen to be. Thus, a thin theory of the judicial
virtues necessary for constitutional adjudication might include
the intellectual virtue of theoretical wisdom, which plausibly is
necessary for judges to understand complex legal material.
Likewise, irrespective of one's particular theory of good
judging, it might turn out that certain vices are inconsistent
with reliably good judging. Judges who are civic cowards,
slavishly seeking approval from others, may be incapable of
reliably adhering to any coherent and plausible theory of good
judicial decision-making." A similar claim might be made about
judges who are avaricious and hence prone to sharp dealing or
70 Perhaps some theories that place a very high value on democratic decision-
making would turn civic cowardice from a vice into a virtue.
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susceptible to bribery and corruption. Thus, civic courage and
temperance might be considered "thin" constitutional virtues.
A thin account of constitutional virtue can be contrasted
to theories that are "thick." What count as virtues for
originalism may be vices for contemporary ratification.
Whereas attention to consequences may be the highest virtue
for a welfarist theory of constitutional interpretation, this
characteristic may actually be a vice for a rights and principles
approach. Corresponding to each theory of constitutional
interpretation, therefore, we can construct a thick theory of
constitutional virtue.
Both thick and thin theories of constitutional virtue
share one important feature in common. As we have defined
these categories, both thick and thin theories view the
constitutional virtues as instrumental. The goal of
constitutional interpretation is set by some other theory-
originalism, welfarism, contemporary ratification, or rights and
principles. For both thick and thin theories of constitutional
virtue, the excellences of judicial character are means to
independently specified ends.
2. From Thick and Thin to Virtue-Centered
To make the aretaic turn in constitutional theory, we
must move beyond thick and thin theories of constitutional
virtue, to a virtue-centered account of judicial excellence. Like
thick theories of constitutional virtue, a virtue-centered theory
is not limited to those qualities of judicial character that would
count as means to good decisions for any plausible theory of
what counts as a good decision. But thickness is not sufficient
to make a theory virtue-centered. One way to bring out this
point is to distinguish theories that are decision-centered from
those that are virtue-centered.
Many normative theories of constitutional adjudication
are decision-centered. A decision-centered theory offers criteria
for what should count as a good, right, just, or legally valid
decision. For a decision-centered theory of constitutional virtue,
the notion of a correct constitutional decision is primary and
the constitutional virtues are derived from it. Thus, Dworkin's
description of Hercules begins with the criteria for good
decisions and then constructs the ideal judge who is able to
render such decisions. A second-best theory like that offered by
Sunstein and Vermeule begins with criteria for good outcomes
and then asks which interpretive methodologies come closest to
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these outcomes, given institutional constraints. A virtue-
centered theory does not proceed in this way. Rather, an
aretaic theory begins with an account of the virtuous judge as
primary and then proceeds to derive the notion of a virtuous
constitutional decision.
By way of clarification, consider some of the claims that
a virtue-centered theory of constitutional adjudication does not
need to make. For a theory to be virtue-centered, it need not
make the transparently silly claim that constitutional
adjudication can be explained solely and exclusively by
reference to the virtues. Thus, the full story about correct or
just or virtuous constitutional decision-making will necessarily
make reference to facts about the world (including the facts of
the disputes which judges decide) and legal facts (including
facts about what provisions are really part of the Constitution,
what prior cases of the Supreme Court are binding precedent,
and so forth). A virtue-centered theory must claim that judicial
virtues are a necessary part of the best theory of constitutional
adjudication and that judicial virtue plays a central
explanatory and normative role, but a theory does not lose its
status as virtue-centered simply because it does not limit its
explanatory resources to the virtues alone.'
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIRTUES AND VICES
The substance of an aretaic theory of constitutional
interpretation is given by its account of the constitutional
virtues. The enterprise in this section of the paper is to develop
an account of constitutional excellence: what makes for
excellence in constitutional adjudicators.
A. Constitutional Vice
Although there is considerable controversy about what
constitutes a good constitutional decision, there is considerable
agreement about some of the characteristics that would make
someone a truly awful constitutional judge. Let us begin, then,
with these easy cases and work from them to an account of the
judicial virtue.
" Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a theory could explain judging without
reference to concepts other than virtues. Facts about the world and the law are
obviously necessary to describe the cases that judges decide. The question is not
whether we admit such facts into our virtue-centered theory. Rather, the question is
how such facts relate to the judicial virtues.
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Corruption. The first (perhaps the worst) judicial vice is
avarice or corruption. We know from experience that
corruption is a real danger for judges. Judicial avarice
expresses itself in the blatant and obvious form of bribery, and
in more subtle financial conflicts of interest such as accepting
favors from a litigant or trading on advanced knowledge of the
outcome of judicial proceedings or setting a precedent that will
benefit a company in which one owns stock." Corruption is not,
of course, a uniquely constitutional vice, but constitutional
corruption is particularly bad, because judges in constitutional
cases occupy a position of special importance, trust, and
responsibility. Because constitutional decisions cannot be
overturned by ordinary legislation and because some
constitutional cases are extraordinarily significant, judicial
corruption can lead to grave injustice to innocent third-parties
unable to protect themselves. That is, an avaricious decision
may lead to the denial to a defendant or litigant of that to
which she is entitled under the law. Corruption or avarice is an
especially heinous fault in judicial character because we expect
judges to display exemplary respect for the law. A corrupt or
avaricious judge cares too much for material rewards or the
pleasures to which they are means, and accepts the wrong
rewards from the wrong people for the wrong reasons.
Notice, however, that the objection to judicial avarice is
not reducible to the concern that litigants get their due. Many
constitutional questions involve "hard cases," where the law
underdetermines the outcome such that a judge can plausibly
rule for either side. In the United States, the Supreme Court
does not regard itself as bound by its own precedents, and
many constitutional issues are hotly contested by closely
divided courts. A corrupt decision on such an issue is evil, even
if the judge votes the right way, getting the law right and
deciding for the party who is entitled to win. A judge is not
better for accepting bribes to render the correct decision.
Civic Cowardice. A second vice is constitutional
cowardice. I do not mean a disposition to excessive fear of
physical danger. Judges in the United States rarely make
constitutional decisions that expose them to significant risks of
7 For general background on judicial corruption and efforts to control it, see
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 1-6
(1993); Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So 'Good Behavior': Criminal
Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1617, 1618-20 & n.127 (1994).
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physical danger-although Supreme Court Justices may be
exposed to danger in unpredictable ways because of their
celebrity. Moreover, in some constitutional cases-abortion
cases for example-passions may be so strong that judges may
in fact receive serious threats of death.
More frequently, however, judges may fear the loss of
office or fear the loss of the opportunity to gain promotions. The
election of judges is common in state judicial systems in the
United States, for example. In some legal systems, judges earn
promotions from lower courts to higher courts through a civil
service system. Even in a system with life tenure (such as the
federal system in the United States), opportunities for
promotion to a higher court or other position of prestige may
depend on avoiding unpopular decisions on matters of public
interest. It is conventional wisdom that judges who seek
promotion to the Supreme Court are careful in their decisions
on politically contentious issues. Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court may hope for promotion to the august position
of Chief Justice of the United States. More simply, ordinary
judges and even Supreme Court Justices may fear the
consequences of condemnation by elite groups or the general
public opinion for their social standing or chances of
advancement. Judges with the vice of civic cowardice fear too
much for their careers and social prestige, and hence are
swayed by concern for their reputation on the wrong occasions
and for the wrong reasons.
Cowardly decisions are bad ones for reasons that are
much the same as those advanced for the conclusion that
corrupt decisions are evil. Judges who rule against the
constitutional claims of unpopular criminal defendants because
they fear they will not be reelected are likely to render
decisions that are unjust because they deny to defendants that
to which they are due. Moreover, a cowardly decision is
properly criticized, even if the outcome of the decision is within
a judge's range of discretion or is, in fact, legally correct. Good
judging requires that the right decision be reached for the right
reason.
Bad Temper. A third judicial vice is bad temper. Trials
in particular and the processes of civil and criminal justice in
general are emotionally charged. Criminal defendants, litigants
and lawyers are all likely to disagree with, criticize, and even
disrespect judicial officers. Judges who are quick to anger or
who harbor resentments that occasionally burst into
inappropriate explosions are likely to damage the judicial
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process. Their anger may cloud their judgment, leading them to
render constitutional decisions that are biased. Even when
inappropriate anger does not directly affect the outcome of
judicial proceedings, it may undermine the confidence of the
participants and public in the judge's fairness, and hence
impair the effectiveness of the judicial process as a mechanism
for resolving conflicts in a manner that gains acceptance and
support from those affected.
The three judicial vices that I have considered so far
(avarice, cowardice, and bad temper) involve defects in judges'
affective states, their emotions or desires. What of defects in
their intellectual equipment? Sometimes constitutional law is
subtle or complex, and a judge may go wrong by failing to grasp
the constitutional rule. When judges fail to understand the law,
their decisions are likely to be unjust. The judge who fails to
comprehend a complex rule or subtle distinction lacks the
equipment to reliably hit the target, a legally correct result. Of
course, even a blindfolded archer may hit the target, and even
a foolish judge may stumble on a legally correct result. If the
decision is the kind that requires justification in the form of a
written opinion, however, even a lucky guess about the
outcome will not save a judge without the ability to grasp the
law intellectually. A well-reasoned opinion on a complex issue
of constitutional law cannot be the product of good luck. In a
system that incorporates the rule of stare decisis, a badly
written opinion can result in injustice in many future cases,
even if the outcome in the case in which the opinion was
rendered was correct.
Although lawyers are well familiar with the problem of
intellectually deficient judges, our vocabulary is not rich with
respect to this vice. We might say that the intellectually
deficient judge suffers from judicial stupidity, or we might
employ a less direct locution, saying such judges are "less than
brilliant" or "somewhat dense." Even less directly, a senior
lawyer might advise junior colleague, "All you can do is make
your record for appeal."
If one intellectual failure is related to legal complexity
or subtlety, there is another sort of intellectual failure
associated with a lack of sound judgment. A judge can be
foolish because he lacks the ability to distinguish between what
is workable and what is impracticable. A related failure is the
inability to distinguish between the aspects of a dispute that
are important and those that are trivial. An adjudicator who is
a poor judge of character will be unable to tell honest witnesses
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from liars or to discern the difference between zealous advocacy
and sharp dealing. Even judges who have a strong theoretical
grasp of the law may go badly wrong if they lack common sense
and sound practical judgment.
Failures in practical judgment by judges can have
serious consequences. Judicial responsibility extends beyond
the task of simply getting the law right and then applying it to
the undisputed facts. Perhaps the clearest example of the
dangers of bad judgment is the complex injunction in a
constitutional case. When the remedy for a constitutional
violation requires a trial judge to supervise a complex
institution, such as a prison (or penal system) or a school
district, the consequences of bad judgment can be serious
indeed. Getting the law right may help the judge to see the
legal goal that ongoing supervision of a complex injunction
requires, but this is not sufficient. An impractical mandate or a
poor allocation of resources can have devastating consequences,
even without a mistake of law.
At this point, I imagine that many readers are becoming
impatient with my list of constitutional vices. "Yes, of course," I
imagine readers saying to themselves, "we don't want corrupt,
cowardly, bad-tempered, stupid, or foolish judges. But none of
those is the most dangerous constitutional vice. Our real
problem is with those judges who are imposing their own
political ideology on the Constitution." And of course, this
reaction can come from any part of the political spectrum. The
right sees judges of the left as judicial activists. The left sees
right-wing judges as intellectually and morally deficient. The
center has similar perceptions of judges from both the far right
and the far left. The most dangerous constitutional vice-
everyone might agree as a suitable level of abstraction-is the
disposition to decide cases on the basis of the wrong political
ideology.
Let us pause and examine our brief and incomplete list
of judicial vices. Judges who are avaricious, cowardly, bad-
tempered, stupid, impractical, or ideological are likely to go
systematically wrong in their decisions. What are the qualities
of character that avoid these defects? What qualities of
character dispose a judge to make excellent decisions? In other
words, what constitutes excellence in constitutional
adjudication?
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B. Constitutional Virtue
Our investigation of the judicial vices suggests that at
least some of the qualities that make for an excellent judge are
the same qualities required for a flourishing human life in
general. The intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical
wisdom and the moral virtues of courage, temperance and good
temper are required for excellence in judging, just as they are
required for any flourishing human life. To put the same point
negatively, a vicious person-someone who is foolish, lacks
common sense, is avaricious, cowardly, and prone to
disproportionate anger-lacks the equipment for excellence in
any social endeavor,"3 including a career as a judge.
Assuming that judicial excellence requires the
possession of the virtues to at least some degree, the next step
is to give an account of the virtues as they operate in the
context of constitutional adjudication. I will briefly describe
five aspects of judicial and constitutional virtue: (1) judicial
temperance, (2) judicial courage, (3) judicial temperament, (4)
judicial intelligence, and (5) judicial wisdom. And of course,
there is the virtue of justice-which will receive extended
treatment in due course."
Before proceeding, two qualifications are in order. First,
by calling these qualities "judicial virtues," I do not mean to
imply any strong claim about their underlying nature. The
psychology of the judicial virtues may well be the same as the
virtues in general. The only distinctive feature of the judicial
virtues that I want to claim might be attributed to the contexts
in which they are exercised.7 r Because judges assume a special
role and face situations that are frequently different from those
faced by the rest of us, the virtues they exercise can be
described in a distinctive way. Second, I do not mean this list to
be exhaustive. Good constitutional adjudication requires more
than just these six qualities of mind and character. The list of
judicial virtues that is offered here is intended to be illustrative
, It is not clear to me that virtue is required for excellence in all human
endeavors. It may, for example, be possible to be a great painter or singer, despite a
vicious character. The claim that I make in this article is that virtue is required for
human endeavors that are social in nature, although I offer no defense for that claim
on this occasion.
7' See supra Part IV.C.
7 The use of "might" indicates that I do not take a stand here. I am not
ruling out the possibility that good judges develop emotional responses that are
psychologically different from those who do not occupy this (or a relevantly similar)
social role.
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but not exhaustive.6 Suzanna Sherry, for example, has
suggested that humility77 is a judicial virtue.
Temperance. Consider first the virtue of temperance.
Good adjudication requires that one's desires be in order. This
is clear when the temperate judge is contrasted to the judge
who is without the ability to control her appetites. Judges who
care too much for their own pleasures are prone to temptation;
they are likely to be swayed from the course of reason and
justice by the temptations of pleasure. A libertine judge may
indulge in pleasures that interfere with the heavy, deliberative
demands of the office. Hence, the saying "sober as a judge,"
reflects the popular understanding that excessive indulgence in
hedonist pleasures would interfere with excellence in the
judicial role.
Courage. A second virtue, judicial courage, corresponds
to the vice of civic cowardice." The ordinary moral virtue of
courage is sometimes thought to serve as a relatively clear
example of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.' Courage is a mean
with respect to the morally neutral emotion of fear. The
disposition to inordinate fear is cowardice. The opposing vice,
rashness, is the disposition to insufficient fear. The coward is
easily intimidated and does not take worthwhile risks. The
rash person fails to perceive genuine danger and so is prone to
injury from foolhardy risk taking.
Judicial courage is a form of what we can call "civic
courage." The courageous judge is willing to risk career and
reputation for the ends of justice. In the case of judging, it is a
bit difficult to see the virtue as a mean between two opposing
vices. If civic cowardice, too much fear of risk, is a familiar
judicial vice, it is a bit difficult to imagine the judge who cares
too little for his career and reputation. In special
circumstances, we can imagine a judge who is too willing to
throw away reputation and influence on a case that is not
worthy of the sacrifice. But this case will need to be a special
one, because in ordinary circumstances we believe that judges
should do as the law and justice requires in every case, not just
76 A number of readers have suggested judicial virtues that might be added to
my list. Judges in common law systems are sometimes required to write opinions that
justify their decisions. In order to do this well, judges need certain skills and capacities
that might be called virtues-eloquence and wit come to mind.
" See Sherry, supra note 45, at 799-803.
76 See id. at 803-810.
For doubts about this, see David Pears, Courage as a Mean, in ESSAYS ON
ARISTOTLE'S ETHiCS 171 (Amdlie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
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important ones. Even the "small injuries" of "little people "'
should be important to judges. Perhaps in a defective society,
where one's ability to prevent grave injustice depended on one's
willingness to inflict minor injustice, we might say that judges
should be neither too fearful nor too careless of the risks of an
unpopular decision. Such a society is defective, however,
because it puts judges in just such a position.
This is not to say that a judge should not care about his
reputation or public opinion. A judge whose public reputation is
good may be enabled to do good judicial work. Civic rashness is
indeed a vice, when judges sacrifice their reputation on the
wrong occasions, for the wrong reasons, or by doing the wrong
things. A judge may engage in extrajudicial behavior that
brings shame or ridicule. But the defect here is not too little
fear of civic disrepute for unpopular decisions. Rather, some
other defect is likely to be involved. Bad temper, immoderation
or poor judgment all may result in a poor reputation or may
damage one's opportunities for civic rewards, but all of these
vices should also be avoided in themselves and not simply
because they reflect a lack of civic courage.
Good temper. A third virtue, judicial temperament
corresponds to the vice of bad temper. The traditional concern
in judicial selection with judicial temperament is illuminated
by Aristotle's account of the virtue of good temper or proates:
the disposition to anger that is proportionate to the provocation
and the situation." Good temper is a mean between excessive
and deficient dispositions to anger. The vice of excess
disposition to anger was illustrated in the United States in
1968 and '69 by Judge Hoffman's disproportionate rage in the
Chicago Seven trial, where his actions produced a spectacle
that undermined public confidence in the orderly
administration of justice. But being too slow to anger is also a
judicial vice. A judge who fails to respond with appropriate
outrage in the face of misconduct can have a similar, if less
dramatic, effect: a courtroom that is out of control is almost as
bad as one in which defendants are bound and gagged. The
virtue of good temper requires that judges feel outrage on the
" A similar notion attributed to Learned Hand is, "It is the daily; it is the
small; it is the cumulative injuries of little people that we are here to protect ... if we
are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: thou shalt not ration
justice." See Dick Baldwin, Lawyers, Justice and Money, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL. 78, 78
(Oct. 1997).
" ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICoMAcHEAN ETHICS 160-61
(J. A. K. Thomson trans., Hugh Tredennick rev., 1976) (1953).
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right occasions for the right reasons and that they demonstrate
their anger in an appropriate way.
Intelligence. The corrective for the vices of judicial
stupidity and ignorance is a form of sophia or theoretical
wisdom. I shall use the phrase "judicial intelligence" to refer to
excellence in understanding and theorizing about the law. A
good judge must be learned in the law; she must have the
ability to engage in sophisticated legal reasoning. Moreover,
judges need the ability to grasp the facts of disputes that may
involve particular disciplines such as accounting, finance,
engineering, or chemistry. Constitutional adjudication may
require an understanding of constitutional history, statistics
and political philosophy. Of course, judicial intelligence is
related to theoretical wisdom in general, but the two are not
necessarily identical. The talents that produce theoretical
wisdom in the law may be different from those that produce the
analogous intellectual virtue in physics, philosophy, or
microbiology. Or it may be that theoretical wisdom is the same
for all these disciplines. If this is the case, then judicial wisdom
may simply be general theoretical wisdom that is
supplemented by the skills or knacks that produce fine legal
thought combined with deep knowledge of the law.
Practical Wisdom. The final virtue is the corrective for
bad judgment or foolishness. I shall use the phrase "judicial
wisdom" or more particularly "constitutional wisdom" to refer
to a judge's possession of the virtue of phronesis or practical
wisdom: in the constitutional context, the excellent judge must
possess practical wisdom in the choosing of constitutional ends
and means.' Practical wisdom is the virtue that enables one to
make good choices in particular circumstances. The person of
practical wisdom knows which particular ends are worth
pursuing and knows which means are best suited to achieve
those ends. Judicial wisdom is simply the virtue of practical
wisdom as applied to the choices that must be made by judges.
The practically wise judge has developed excellence in knowing
what goals to pursue in the particular case and excellence in
choosing the means to accomplish those goals. In the literature
of legal theory, Karl Llewellyn's notion of "situation sense"
" My account of phronesis has been influenced by many sources. See, e.g.,
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTURE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); W. F.
R. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 212-39 (1968); TROELS ENGBERG-PEDERSEN,
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF MORAL INSIGHT (1983).
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captures much of the content of the notion that judicial wisdom
corresponds to the intellectual virtue of phronesis.'
This abstract account of judicial wisdom can be made
more concrete by considering the contrast between practical
wisdom and theoretical wisdom in the judicial context. The
judge who possesses theoretical wisdom is the master of legal
theory, with the ability to engage in sophisticated legal
reasoning and insight into subtle connections in legal doctrine.
But a judge who possesses judicial intelligence is still not
necessarily a reliably good judge, even if she affirms the correct
procedure for judicial decision-making. The need for common
sense at the trial level is relatively obvious: trial judges need
managerial skills that are not supplied by legal theory.' But
the virtue of practical wisdom is a prerequisite for excellence in
appellate judging as well. The practically wise judge has an
intuitive sense as to how real live lawyers and parties will
react to judicial decisions. Judicial wisdom is required to know
whether a particular doctrinal formulation will work in the real
world of adversary proceedings and evidentiary rules. A multi-
factor balancing test that is theoretically sound may be
impracticably indeterminate in practice; a bright line that is
attractive in the abstract may be too rigid in concrete cases.
Suzanna Sherry's recent Essay, Judges of Character,
nicely summarizes the importance of practical wisdom in
judging:
Readers may complain that rather than describing how pragmatist
judging might be accomplished, I have focused only on who might
make a good pragmatist judge. That is because, in one sense,
pragmatist judging is like good writing: you cannot teach someone to
do it by laying down rules, or even guidelines. Indeed, rules tend to
diminish rather than improve the quality of writing. (Look at any
example of good writing and see how many times it violates the
"rules" you were taught in school.) Experience, particularly under
the careful tutelage of a good writer, is the best teacher. And so it is
with pragmatism: at best, we can provide exemplars, we can rely on
experience to guide judges, and we can look for character traits--akin
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
59-61, 121-57 & 206-08 (1960); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 216-27 (1973). See also Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical
Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 544-49 (1991)
(contemporary application of Llewellyn's idea).
, See generally Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,
376-78 (1982).
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to an inborn ear for language in good writers--that lend themselves
to good judgment.'
The phronimos has an ear for justice and an eye for legal
salience. In the constitutional cases, we might call this
situation sense "constitutional vision."
C. The Virtue of Justice
Justice is next. If we know anything about judges, it is
that they ought to be just. If constitutional adjudicators should
possess any virtue, then surely they should possess the
constitutional form of the virtue of justice.'
1. The Centrality of Justice
If justice is a virtue, how does it relate to the others? It
seems clear that the virtue of justice is central. We can imagine
a Supreme Court Justice who has the natural virtues of
temperance, civic courage and good temper. Suppose this
Justice has the right intellectual equipment as well, a strong
intellect, a good sense of practicality and what Llewellyn called
"situation sense" in matters legal. 7 But if our hypothetical
Justice lacked the virtue of justice, then all the rest would
seem to be for naught.
For the moment, I want to set aside the question
whether one could possess all the other virtues (as natural
virtues) but lack justice.' If, for the sake of argument, we can
imagine the unjust woman or man, fully endowed with the
natural virtues, but lacking in justice, it is clear that such an
adjudicator would be an especially bad Supreme Court Justice.
Taking the problem from the other end, if there could be a
Justice who lacked the other natural virtues, but possessed a
strongly developed virtue of justice, then we might have a
Supreme Court Justice who was a superb interpreter of the
See Sherry, supra note 45, at 810.
We are not tempted to name the distinctively judicial or constitutional
form of this virtue, "judicial justice" or "constitutional justice," as we could so name
judicial courage, judicial wisdom, or judicial temperament. This is not because there is
no association, but rather because the association is too close. We call judges on the
Supreme Court, "Justices," we call the buildings that judges occupy the "halls of
justice," and we call what they do, "the administration of justice."
"7 See supra text accompanying note 83.
a It may well turn out that a judge cannot have the virtue of "judicial
wisdom" or phronesis and also lack a sense of justice. Questions about the unity of the
judicial virtues will be touched on below.
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Constitution but not a very good human. Off the bench, the life
of the just (but otherwise vicious) judge might be a disaster,
but we would seem to lack grounds for criticism if all of the
Justice's decisions were just.
Laying the thought experiment to the side, our working
hypothesis is that justice is an essential virtue for excellence in
constitutional interpretation. Without justice, constitutional
adjudication cannot be good. With justice, judging in
constitutional cases must be good. Justice, we might say, is the
cardinal virtue of constitutional interpretation.
At this point, I suspect that my readers are dividing into
two groups. One group is happily endorsing the implications of
my discussion of the virtue of justice. I imagine someone from
this group thinking: "I'm not sure we need to make the aretaic
turn to get to this conclusion, but I am quite happy to accept
the conclusion that good constitutional adjudication must aim
at justice and hence that judges should be selected for their
possession of the virtue of justice." Another group of readers is
getting rather antsy and beginning to formulate a critique of
my theory. I imagine a member of this second group saying to
herself: "Supreme Court Justices are supposed to follow the
Constitution and not impose their own sense of justice in the
guise of constitutional law." If you find yourself falling into one
of these two camps, you might suspend judgment for just a few
more pages. Members of the first group: before you know it, you
will be disappointed. Members of the second group: you may be
pleasantly surprised. But before we can get to the punch line,
we need to think harder about the idea that justice is virtue.
2. Is Justice a Virtue?
There are a number of difficulties with incorporating
the virtue of justice into a virtue-centered theory of
constitutional adjudication. To begin, it is not easy to pin down
the sense in which "justice" is a moral virtue in the Aristotelian
sense. Aristotle found it difficult to fit justice into the schema of
virtue as a mean between two opposing vices with respect to a
morally neutral affective state such as an emotion or desire.' If
justice is giving persons their due, or doing what is fair, then
what are the opposing vices? In the case of an individual, we
might be tempted to postulate justice as a mean between the
' See Bernard Williams, Justice as a Virtue, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S
ETHICS 189 (Amlie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
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disposition to take more than one's share and the disposition to
take less, but this solution has many well-known difficulties,
including the problem that taking too little for one's self is not
usually characterized as an instance of injustice. In the case of
judges, this solution is unavailable in any event. In the usual
case, judges do not take for themselves when they decide
cases.'
If justice does not fit the pattern of temperance,
courage, and good temper, then what kind of disposition could
justice be? Bernard Williams suggests that the notion of a just
outcome "is prior to that of a fair or just person. Such a person
is one who is disposed to promote just distributions, look for
them, stand by them, and so on. . .. "'l "The disposition of
justice," Williams continues, "will lead the just person to resist
unjust distributions-and to resist them however they are
motivated."" On Williams's account, then, justice is a virtue,
but it does not fit the pattern of the other moral virtues. Justice
is not a mean with respect to a morally neutral emotion or
desire; rather, justice, the virtue, is the disposition to aim at
fairness (for a judge, to give the parties that which is due to
them). Williams's picture of the virtue of justice poses an
important problem for a virtue-centered theory of
constitutional interpretation. If the concept of justice were
prior to the virtue of justice, then it would follow that a
normative theory of constitutional interpretation cannot be
virtue-centered. Rather, we would begin with a theory of
constitutional interpretation and then define the constitutional
virtue of justice as the disposition to adhere to that theory.
Theory first, virtue second-that is the picture implied by
Williams's analysis.
Of course, it might turn out that justice is not wholly
independent of the virtues, even if it is prior to them. Thus, it
might turn out that only someone with the right character will
be good at devising just solutions to difficult problems or
discerning the just outcome in a hard case. "But even there,"
Williams points out, "it is important that, although it took [a
virtuous constitutional interpreter], or someone like [a virtuous
9 There are, however, unusual cases. As the discussion of the vice of judicial
avarice reminds us, judges sometimes do "take for themselves" when they decide cases.
This occurs when a judge takes a bribe or fails to disqualify herself from a case in
which she has a financial stake. See supra, Part IV.A.
" Williams, supra note 89, at 196-97.
Id. at 197.
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constitutional interpreter], to think of it, the [constitutional
interpretation] can then be recognized as fair independently of
that person's character."93 Moreover, it may turn out that only
someone with the virtues will be capable of the disposition to
promote just outcomes. That is, nothing in Williams's account
precludes the possibility that disposition to do justice is simply
not, as a matter of fact, consistent with possession of the vices
of avarice, civic cowardice, bad temper, stupidity, or
foolishness.'
Thus, if we accept the centrality of justice for
constitutional interpretation and Williams's view that theories
of justice are prior to the virtue of justice, it would seem that
we cannot have a virtue-centered theory of constitutional
adjudication. How can virtue jurisprudence answer Williams's
challenge?
3. The Structure of the Virtue of Justice
Justice is the disposition to give each what they are due.
Can we say anything more about this disposition? A full
account of the structure of justice is outside the scope of our
current inquiry, but we can, nonetheless, make some progress
by considering impartiality, lawfulness, and legal vision as
constituents of the virtue of justice.
Impartiality. Consider the quality that we might call
"judicial impartiality," the disposition to even-handed
sympathy or empathy with the parties to a legal dispute.
Judges should not identify more strongly with one side than
with the other,' but a good judge must be able to understand
the interests and passions of all the parties. The degree of
"partiality" or identification with the viewpoints and interests
of the litigants that is appropriate to the role of judge is
different from that which is appropriate to other situations.
Parents should be partial to their children, and friends partial
to one another. Judges should be partial to none, but should
possess an appropriate degree of sympathy and empathy with
Id.
" To avoid confusion, I should note that I do not believe that the paragraph
in text is an answer to the challenge that Williams's argument poses for a virtue-
centered theory of judging.
"The judicial virtues are those that allow people to stand back from their
personal commitments and projects and judge them from an impersonal point of view."
STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 275 (1990).
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all who appear before them.' A disposition to fairness is
constituted in part by having the right sort of emotional
equipment for sympathy, an appropriate, evenhanded, concern
for the interests of others.
In the context of constitutional adjudication, the
temptation to be resisted is frequently ideological. The great
ideological struggles of partisan politics frequently come before
the courts in constitutional guise. Judges are nominated and
confirmed by the political branches at the federal level and may
run for office at the state level. It would not be surprising then,
if judges found themselves tempted to use their power of
constitutional interpretation to advance their own political
ideologies. Ideological partiality is a special temptation for
judges in constitutional cases. Judges with the constitutional
form of the virtue of justice are disposed to impartiality, even
when their deepest political commitments are at stake.
Lawfulness. There is another quality that is closely
connected with the disposition to do what is just. The good
judge must have a special concern for fidelity to law and for the
coherence of law. Let us call this "justice as lawfulness." To
understand Aristotle's own account of justice as lawfulness, we
need to say a bit about the Greek word nomos which is
translated as law. The eminent Aristotle scholar, Richard
Kraut explains:
[WIhen [Aristotle] says that a just person, speaking in the broadest
sense is nominos, he is attributing to such a person a certain
relationship to the laws, norms, and customs generally accepted by
some existing community. Justice has to do not merely with the
written enactments of a community's lawmakers, but with the wider
set of norms that govern the members of that community. Similarly,
the unjust person's character is expressed not only in his violations
of the written code of laws, but more broadly in his transgression of
the rules accepted by the society in which he lives.
There is another important way in which Aristotle's use of the term
nomos differs from our word 'law': he makes a distinction between
nomoi and what the Greeks of his time called psiphismata-
conventionally translated as 'decrees'. A decree is a legal enactment
addressed solely to present circumstances, and sets no precedent
that applies to similar cases in the future. By contrast a nomos is
meant to have general scope: it applies not only to cases at hand but
I do not mean to imply that judges may never be partial or that persons
who do not occupy the judicial role should never be impartial. All of us, judges and non-
judges alike, should be partial on the right occasions, toward the right persons, for the
right reasons. Similarly, we all need the capacity and propensity for impartiality when
the situation demands it.
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to a general category of cases that can be expected to occur in the
future.'
Rule by decree, Aristotle believed, was typical of
tyranny-the rule of individuals and not of law; a regime that
rules by decree does not provide the stability and certainty that
is required for human communities to flourish. 8 Kraut
continues:
We can now begin to see why Aristotle thinks that justice in its
broadest sense can be defined as lawfulness, and why he has such
high regard for a lawful person. His definition embodies the
assumption that every community requires the high degree of order
that that comes from having a stable body of customs and norms,
and a coherent legal code that is not altered frivolously and
unpredictably. Justice in its broadest sense is the intellectual and
emotional skill one needs in order to do one's part in bringing it
about that one's community possesses this stable system of rules and
laws."
Once we understand Aristotle in this way, it become
apparent that Williams's view of the virtue of justice is in a
sense topsy turvey. Williams seems to suggest that having the
virtue of justice consists in the disposition to act in accord with
the right theory of justice, but, of course, different individuals
will have different beliefs about which theory is the right
theory. If each constitutional adjudicator acts on the basis of
her own theory of justice-her own political ideology-then
constitutional adjudication will become an ideological struggle,
with the content of the law shifting with the political winds.
Aristotle's view is quite different. The excellent judge is a
nominos, someone who grasps the importance of lawfulness
and acts on the basis of the laws and norms of her community.
Of course, the Aristotelean view has problematic
implications. The deeply held norms of some societies may now
strike us as wicked. In ancient Greece, for example, slavery
was accepted as legitimate and was supported by legal
institutions. Not so long ago, deeply held norms in the United
States supported the institution of segregation. And in
thoroughly wicked societies, like Nazi Germany, the whole
fabric of law and social norms may be corrupt. When I say that
the excellent judge is a nominos, this implies that good judging
does not involve the substitution of the judge's private
17 RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 105-06 (2002).
' Id. at 106.
9Id.
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judgment about the morality of social practices for the deeply
held norms of the society. The full development of these ideas is
a very large topic that is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Constitutional vision. In the context of constitutional
adjudication, the virtue of justice requires the ability to
perceive the salient features of particular situations. We can
use Llewellyn's term, "situation sense," or by way of analogy to
the phrase "moral vision," we might say that a sense of justice
requires "constitutional vision," the ability to size up a
constitutional case and discern its constitutionally salient
dimension. This requires an intellectual grasp of the content of
the law, an understanding of the underlying purposes the law
serves, and an ability to pick out the features of particular
cases that are important for those rules and purposes. In other
words, the virtue of justice is strongly connected to phronesis or
practical wisdom and the truly excellent constitutional
adjudicator must be a phronimos-a person of practical
wisdom.
In sum, the virtue of justice can be given determinant
content by decomposing the abstract idea of justice into its
component dispositions and abilities. Although the account
offered here is partial and incomplete, it nonetheless points in
the direction of a fuller account of the structure of justice. That
structure includes impartiality, lawfulness, and legal vision. To
be an excellent interpreter of the constitution, a judge must (1)
be impartial among persons and ideologies, (2) be dedicated to
the rule of law, and (3) possess constitutional vision, the ability
to discern the constitutionally salient dimensions of particular
constitutional cases.
D. A Preliminary Statement of the Theory
For the sake of simplicity and clarity, I shall formulate a
virtue-centered theory of constitutional adjudication in the
form of a series of de'iLitions:
9A judicial virtue is a naturally possible disposition of
mind or will that when present with the other judicial
virtues reliably disposes its possessor to make just
decisions. The judicial virtues include temperance,
courage, good temper, intelligence, wisdom, and justice.
A constitutional virtue is simply a judicial virtue in the
context of constitutional adjudication.
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e A virtuous judge is a judge who possesses the judicial
virtues, and a virtuous constitutional adjudicator
possesses those judicial virtues that are relevant to
constitutional interpretation.
* A virtuous constitutional interpretation is an
interpretation of the constitution made by a virtuous
judge acting from the judicial virtues in the
circumstances relevant to the case in which the
interpretation was rendered.
9 A legally correct constitutional interpretation is an
interpretation that would be characteristically made by
a virtuous judge in the circumstances relevant to the
case in which the interpretation was rendered.' °
9 A just decision of a constitutional case is the decision
that would be rendered in accord with a virtuous
constitutional interpretation, in cases in which the
constitutional interpretation would control the outcome
of the case.'
Thus, the central normative thesis of a virtue-centered
theory of constitutional adjudication is that judges ought to be
virtuous and ought to make virtuous decisions. Judges who
lack the virtues should aim to make lawful or legally correct
decisions, although they may not be able to do this reliably
given that they lack the virtues. Judges who lack the judicial
virtues ought to develop them. Judges ought to be selected on
the basis of their possession of (or potential for the acquisition
of) the judicial virtues.
'1 The distinction between virtuous and correct decisions is introduced to
distinguish between a fully virtuous decision (made by a virtuous judge acting from the
virtuous) from a merely correct decision (made for the wrong reasons). In order to be
legally correct, a decision need only conform to the virtues; it need not be made for the
right reason.
1o" Of course, in many constitutional cases, a virtuous decision would be
rendered on grounds that are independent from the Constitution. For example, a
dormant commerce clause case might be resolved on the basis of a procedural rule that
does not implicate the Constitution. For ease of exposition, the account in text focuses
only on cases in which the constitutional interpretation is the basis of a virtuous
decision. The definitions in text can be generalized so that they encompass virtuous
decisions generally and not simply virtuous constitutional interpretations. See Solum,
Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note 2.
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Unlike other theories of constitutional adjudication, a
virtue-centered theory makes the claim that virtue is an
ineliminable part of the explanation of and justification for the
practice of judging. According to a virtue-centered theory, the
whole story about what the Constitution requires in particular
cases includes the virtues. If they were to be left out, the story
would be incomplete. Moreover, a virtue-centered theory
suggests that it sometimes requires judicial virtue to recognize
the legally correct result. It always requires judicial virtue to
make reliable judgments about the just outcome. Laws and
rules do not apply themselves; judgment is always required for
a general rule to be applied to a particular case. Practical
wisdom or good judgment is required to insure that the rules
are applied correctly.
In the end, agreement and disagreement about what
rules mean and how they should be applied are rooted in
practical judgments. Even with respect to some easy cases and
more frequently with respect to complex cases, articulated
reasons will not suffice to explain why, in cases of bottom-line
disagreement about the application of a rule to the facts, one
judgment is legally correct and competing judgments are not.
Indeed, a virtue-centered account allows us to
appreciate the fact that explanations or justifications of legal
decisions play more than one role. In some cases, when a judge
explains a decision, the intention is to lay bare the premises
and reasoning that moved the judge from accepted premises
about the law and the facts to some conclusion about what
result is legally correct. There are other cases, however, where
explanations play a different role. When the decision of a case
is based on legal vision or situation sense-that is, when the
decision is based on the virtue of judicial wisdom or
phronesis-then the point of an explanation is to enable others
to come to see the relevant features of the case. Such
explanations do not recreate a decision procedure; rather, they
are aimed at enabling others to acquire practical wisdom.
E. Aretaic Constitutional Formalism
Even with all of that said, big questions remain. At this
point the reader might reasonably ask for a less abstract
account of the aretaic approach to constitutional interpretation.
But all this is so abstract. What does justice as lawfulness
really mean? How would a virtuous constitutional interpreter
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apply the principle of lawfulness to the practical problem of
abstracting meaning from the Constitution?
And of course, all that I can really do by way of answer
is to sign a promissory note, because the articulation of a fully
developed aretaic theory of constitutional interpretation
requires an extended articulation-a short monograph of its
own, at the very least. Nonetheless, a sketch is possible. Here
are six principles that give more shape and structure to the
idea of constitutional justice as lawfulness:
Principle One, Precedent: Judges in constitutional cases
should follow an adequate and articulated doctrine of
stare decisis. Among the features of such a doctrine is
that even courts of last resort (i.e. the United States
Supreme Court) should regard their own decisions as
binding, unless there is a compelling reason to do
otherwise.
Principle Two, Plain Meaning: When the precedents run
out, judges should look to the plain meaning of the
salient provisions of the constitutional text.
Principle Three, Intratextualism and Structure: When
the text of a particular provision(s) is ambiguous, judges
should construe that provision so as to be consistent
with other related provisions and with the structure of
the Constitution as a whole.
Principle Four, Original Meaning: If ambiguity still
persists, judges should make a good faith effort to
determine the original meaning, where original
meaning is understood to be the meaning that (1) the
framers would have reasonably expected, (2) the
audience to whom the Constitution is addressed
(ratifiers, contemporary interpreters), (3) to attribute to
the framers, and (4) based on the evidence (public
record) that was publicly available.
Principle Five, Default Rules: And when ambiguity
persists after all of that, judges should resort to general
default rules that minimize their own discretion and
maximize the predictability and certainty of the law.
The default rules should include a presumption in favor
of settled historical practice by the political branches,
weighted by duration, proximity to ratification, the
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soundness of the reasons offered for the practice, and
strength of consensus among the political branches.
Principle Six, Lexicality and Holism: The first five
principles are to be understood as lexically ordered in
the following sense. Judges should order their
deliberations by the first five principles-attempting to
structure their conscious deliberations by attending to
the features highlighted by each principle in order
before proceeding to the next principle. But this
requirement does not entail that judges either will not
or should not recognize that the considerations
thematized by one principle may be relevant to
deliberations explicitly organized by another principle.
Thus, the interpretation of a precedent will sometimes
(perhaps always) require consideration of the text,
structure, and original meaning, and so forth. These are
principles not rules, and lexical ordering operates as a
methodological heuristic and not as a rigid rule.
There is more than one way to skin a cat, and there are
many ways to articulate an aretaic theory of constitutional
interpretation that realize the ideal of constitutional justice as
lawfulness. But even this very sketchy account is sufficient to
point in the right direction. These six principles provide an
articulated framework for constitutional justice as lawfulness.10'
V. THE ARETAIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
CRITIQUE
How does the aretaic turn affect our understanding of
institutionalism? Recall that Sunstein and Vermeule were
primarily concerned with the institutional capacities of judges.
Indeed, the examples they provided consistently focused on the
abilities of individual judges as opposed to the institutional
design of the judiciary as a system. We are now in a position to
restate their position from the perspective of virtue
jurisprudence.
Where Sunstein and Vermeule raise the possibility that
judges would be unable to fulfill the demands of a particular
"2 A slightly different version of these principles was originally presented on
Legal Theory Blog as part of an exchange with Jack Balkin. See Lawrence Solum, A
Neoformalist Manifesto (May 18, 2003), at http://lsolum.blogspot.com]2003_05-01
lsolum-archive.html#200307682 (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
[Vol. 70:2
2004-051 THE ARETAIC TURN IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 523
theory of constitutional interpretation, virtue jurisprudence
seeks to diagnose the reason for the failure. For the most part,
Sunstein and Vermeule seem to be focused on intellectual
deficiency-although they never provide a very detailed
explanation as to what the nature of the deficiency might be.
Virtue jurisprudence can embrace this insight while offering a
richer and more fully developed account of judicial vice.
Moreover, virtue jurisprudence offers a positive account of the
judicial excellences.
Sunstein and Vermeule's analysis assumes that
institutional capacities are a given. That is, their analysis of
the second best takes judicial incapacity as a constant and
treats interpretive methodology as a variable. An aretaic
approach rejects this assumption and instead suggests that
judges ought to be selected for their possession of the judicial
virtues. It is inevitable that some judges will possess the
judicial excellences to a higher degree than others. Virtue
jurisprudence suggests that the most virtuous judges should be
appointed to the courts with the greatest responsibilities. Most
obviously, our very best judges ought to serve on the Supreme
Court.
Of course, an institutionalist critic of virtue
jurisprudence might argue that the aretaic solution is utopian.
Although the first-best system of constitutional adjudication
might have excellent judges, mediocre judges populate the real
world. Even if some judges on the federal appellate courts have
the requisite virtues, is it realistic to imagine that such virtues
will ever be possessed by the judges on the Circuit Court of
Cook County? Moreover, the critic might continue, real-world
political processes are unlikely to result in the appointment or
election of excellent judges. Judgeships are sometimes rewards
for political service. Supreme Court Justices may be selected on
the basis of their ideological fervor on key issues (such as Roe v.
Wade) rather than their intelligence, wisdom, good temper or
courage. Indeed, from the point of view of the President seeking
to achieve a political agenda, these characteristics might be
viewed as negatives. The President might prefer a Justice who
will reliably cast votes that are politically correct. Indeed, it
might appear that Presidents, who nominate Justices, and
Senators, who confirm them, are themselves unlikely to
possess the executive and legislative virtues. Rather than
aiming at the common good, executives and legislators may
aim at their own reelection.
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Thus, the institutionalist critic of virtue jurisprudence
might argue that, for institutional reasons, we should not even
aim at virtue. Instead, we should try to design institutions that
are vice-proof. The next section suggests that institutionalism
is itself subject to this kind of criticism.
A. The Institutional Tu Quoque
Adding institutional concerns to the agenda of
constitutional theory does not make our choices easier. It
makes them more complex. The world of the second best is a
world of imperfect information, decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty, and unintended consequences. If
there is a virtue deficit, who shall make the decisions that seem
to require extraordinary virtue? Can institutional analysis
solve the problem of institutional capacity? Or ought we say to
the institutionalist, "tu quoque":.°. your theory suffers from the
very problems of institutional incapacity and unintended
dynamic effects that infect first-best theories. The institutional
tu quoque can operate at two distinct levels, each of which
deserves separate comment. First, Sunstein and Vermeule's
institutionalism needs to address the question whether second-
best interpretive methodologies really overcome the problems
of institutional incapacity. Second, institutionalism must
address the question as to which institutions have the capacity
to act as the architect for an institutionally sensitive approach
to constitutional interpretation.
1. Institutional Deficits and Second-Best Methodologies
The first level at which the institutional tu quoque
operates is the level of second-best methodologies. Sunstein
and Vermeule offer a set of suggestions for interpretive
practice. Roughly speaking, they argue that judges may do
better with simple interpretive strategies, such as clause-bound
interpretivism, because these simple second-best principles
demand less of judges than do more complex first-best
principles.
There is, however, no a priori reason to believe that
simple interpretive methodologies will actually improve
decision-making of real world judges. "If judges are corrupt,
'0 "Tu quoque" is latin for "you, too" or "you are another." See http://www.
fallacyfiles.org/tuquoque.html.
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biased, poorly informed, or otherwise unreliable,"'. they might
do rather badly using clause-bound interpretivism or some
other simple-minded methodology. Consider an obvious
example. The First Amendment says, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.""' A
corrupt, biased, poorly informed, or otherwise unreliable judge
might conclude that when this clause says "Congress," it means
to exclude the states and the judiciary from the scope of the
First Amendment. Given this possibility, is it so clear that
"poor translators" would "garbl[e] meanings so badly that a
simple-minded transliteration would preserve more of the
original than would an ambitious and mistaken attempt to
capture the original's real sense"' The answer, of course, is
"No, it is not clear." The reason is that application even of the
plainest version of plain-meaning textualism requires the
virtues of judicial intelligence and wisdom.
2. Institutional Deficits and Institutional Design
The second level at which the institutional tu quoque
operates is the level of institutional design. Institutionalism
cannot assume that real-world institutional design is
acontextual. Rather, in the real-world, institutions are
designed and built by other institutions and individuals,
themselves subject to institutional limitations. The question
then becomes, which institutions have the institutional
capacity to design interpretive practices that are likely to
overcome the institutional deficiencies of first-best theories of
constitutional interpretation? There are at least three
candidates for the role of institutional architect: (1) the
judiciary, (2) the political branches, and (3) legal analysts.
a. The Judiciary as Institutional Architect
Could judges serve as the institutional architects of a
second-best interpretive methodology? The crafting of rules and
principles to guide constitutional interpretation would
"o Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 935.
o U.S. CONST. amend. I.
o Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 942.
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naturally seem to be a judicial role. In a common law system,
interpretive methodologies emerge from accumulated judicial
decisions. Thus, in a constitutional system that incorporates a
strong common-law tradition, the judiciary might be the
obvious candidate for the role of institutional architect.
There is, however, an obvious difficulty with the
candidacy of judges for the role of institutional architects.
Sunstein and Vermeule hypothesize that judges lack sufficient
virtue to make the relatively less complex decisions that
involve only first-best considerations. Judgments about the
second-best theory start where first-best analysis leaves off.
Second-best decision-making requires mastery of the first-best
theory and institutional analysis. If judges lack sufficient
virtue to use first-best interpretive methodologies, then it
would seem unlikely that they be able to serve as institutional
architects. If they made the attempt, they might craft
interpretive methodologies that would lead institutionally
crippled judges to make even worse decisions than they would
make by employing the first-best interpretive strategies.
Perhaps this problem can be avoided if the higher courts
possess the institutional capacity to serve as institutional
architects for lower courts. Although Cook County Circuit
Court judges may lack the necessary institutional capacities,
perhaps those capacities can be found in some of the Judges on
the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit.
Appellate rather than trial judges may be institutionally
capable of shaping interpretive rules and practices that achieve
second-best outcomes.
If we assume that appellate courts possess the requisite
institutional capacity, why are appellate courts incapable of
supervising the lower court's application of first-best methods
of constitutional interpretation? If lower courts attempting to
make holistic sense of the constitution go badly wrong, then
appellate courts can reverse them. Over time, this process
should result in the emergence of a first-best body of
constitutional precedent. It might be argued that lower courts
are capable of employing second-best rules and principles of
constitutional interpretation, but incapable of following
precedents based on first-best interpretive methods. But to the
contrary, it would be no harder for judges to adhere to
constitutional doctrine based on holistic meaning or based on
faithful translation (to take Amar and Lessig's approaches as
illustrative) than to follow less coherent doctrines or doctrines
that mistranslate original meanings.
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Thus, it appears that Sunstein and Vermeule's first
option is not available. Judges cannot be the institutional
architects of second-best methods of constitutional
interpretation, if the assumptions behind the critique of first-
best methodologies are correct.
b. The Political Branches as Institutional Architects
The next possibility is that the political branches (either
legislative or executive) might contain the necessary
institutional capacities. Perhaps Presidents or Senators can
construct the necessary rules and principles. If the judicial
branch is not up to the task, then the next place to look would
seem to be the other branches of government.
There are, however, difficulties with this solution as
well. Although some members of the political branches are
trained in the law, many are not. Even those with legal
training may lack sufficient judicial experience to craft second-
best principles that will actually suffice to guide incapable
judges towards second-best outcomes. For example, a President
might instruct his appointees to "strictly construe" the
constitution without realizing that a rule of "strict
construction" does not actually provide guidance in particular
case. Or Senators might admonish judicial appointees "to apply
the law and not make it," without realizing that the difference
between law application and law making is subtle and that this
principle does not apply itself.
Moreover, it is not clear that the political branches are
better staffed than the judiciary. Presidents and Senators, too,
may be "corrupt, biased, poorly informed or otherwise
unreliable."1 7 Because electoral processes are shaped by a
variety of factors, importantly including the ability to raise
money, it might even be argued that the political branches are
more likely than judges to be corrupted by political
contributions, biased in favor of donors, ill-informed about
issues not of concern to contributors, and otherwise unreliable.
One might argue that while elected officials may lack
the requisite institutional capacities, their professional staffs
may be incorruptible, evenhanded, well-informed, and
otherwise reliable. Perhaps, the staff of the Senate Judiciary
Committee or the Office of Legal Counsel has the requisite
107 Id. at 935.
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institutional capacities. There are, however, problems with this
option. Initially, it is not clear why incapable elected officials
would select capable staff members. It seems likely that many
elected officials would select staff members whose capacities
and motivations were aligned with their own. Moreover, it is
not clear whether professional staffs have the requisite
institutional authority to impose second-best interpretive
methodologies on judges, even assuming the staff members
have the ability to devise the requisite rules and principles.
This last point leads to another. Assuming that the
political branches include actors with virtues sufficient to craft
second-best principles of constitutional interpretation, what
institutional mechanism is available to ensure the
implementation of the principles? At the federal level in the
United States, judges are appointed for life terms with
guarantees against diminished compensation. Even assuming
judges were to pledge adherence to the second-best
methodologies as part of the nomination and confirmation
process, is there any institutional mechanism that can ensure
that corrupt, biased, ill-informed and otherwise incapable
judges will fulfill these pledges? In our constitutional system,
Congress cannot legislate constitutional methodology, nor can
the President do so through executive order.
A more radical institutional reform could provide for
more direct control by the political branches of the process of
constitutional interpretation. After all, the Constitution can be
amended. Life-tenure could be abolished, or we could allow an
appeal from the Supreme Court to the Congress on
constitutional issues. Perhaps, the contemporary political
branches can provide us with a better constitutional plan than
did those assembled who assembled at Philadelphia. But if
contemporary institutional architects are not up to the task,
the result might be a constitutional system even worse than
the status quo.
c. Legal Analysts as Institutional Architects
It is possible that the institutional tu quoque has, so far,
been aimed at straw men. Perhaps, we should look for the
requisite virtues in the legal analysts rather than in
government officials. There are, however, obvious problems
with this solution. First, it is not clear how legal analysts will
influence outcomes. They can diagnosis institutional ills, but
how will their prescriptions affect the decisions made by
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political institutions? If the judges, executives, and legislators
possessed sufficient virtue to grasp academic criticism and act
on it wisely, they would have the virtues necessary to
implement first-best judicial appointments and interpretive
methods. But if they lack these virtues, they lack the capacity
to respond appropriately to academic criticism and advice.
Second, do legal analysts themselves even have the
requisite virtues? Or is the legal analyst, like the judge and the
politician, open to an institutional tu quoque? Is
institutionalism, considered pragmatically as it is really
practiced by academics in particular institutional contexts,
itself open to an institutional critique? There are reasons to
believe that it is and that institutional legal analysts may lack
the capabilities to achieve the effects they intend.
How might an institutionalist critique of
institutionalism proceed? Let us begin with the institutional
context for legal analysis. Legal analysts are usually isolated in
ivory towers. This does not facilitate the full development of
the crucial virtue of phronesis or practical wisdom. But
institutional analysis suggests that this virtue is crucial. When
academic theories are translated into practice, there may be
unintended consequences. Without practical wisdom,
academicians are unlikely to foresee such consequences. That
is, academicians would seem to systematically lack an
institutional capacity requisite for the role of institutional
architect. Utilization of legal analysts as institutional
architects might also lead to dynamic effects. Sunstein and
Vermeule recommend that judges should eschew aiming at
first-best interpretations of the Constitution, but how do they
know that they have been able to foresee the unintended
consequences that this proposal might have when
implemented? Might a variety of institutional actors attempt to
exploit this proposal, using Sunstein and Vermeule's argument
to justify the selection of mediocre judges who pledge allegiance
to a simplistic methodology ("strict construction" or "clause
bound interpretivism") that is merely window dressing for
ideological commitment to particular outcomes on politically
important issues? Or if academics became the institutional
architects of constitutional reform, might powerful interests
seek to corrupt the legal academics, perhaps establishing well-
funded societies and think tanks that would offer grants or
travel opportunities to academics who would adopt preferred
theories of constitutional interpretation?
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In sum, from the armchair perspective of Sunstein and
Vermeule's Essay, it isn't at all clear that there is any set of
institutional actors who have the requisite capacities to act as
the institutional architects of a second-best system of
constitutional interpretation. But if no one can serve this role,
then it would seem to follow that the charge of tu quoque is
rightly aimed at institutional analysis.
B. The Lesson of the Institutional Tu Quoque
The point of the institutional tu quoque is not to
undermine institutional analysis. Indeed, all of the criticisms
that I have advanced of Sunstein and Vermeule's particular
arguments and proposals are in the spirit of institutional
analysis itself. Rather, the point of the tu quoque is to lay bare
a hidden premise in Sunstein and Vermeule's analysis.
Institutional analysis implicitly assumes that some actor
possesses the virtues of mind and character that are required
for institutionalist criticisms to be translated into practice.
Institutions cannot act, except through individuals. Theoretical
critiques are practically impotent unless translated into
appropriate action. That is: institutional analysis itself requires
the aretaic turn.
Institutional analysis can move constitutional
interpretation from ideal theory to a contextualized analysis
that focuses on the real-world capacities of judges. By making
this move, institutionalists have already made the aretaic turn.
The institutionalist observation-that various theories of
constitutional interpretation make minimal assumptions about
the character and capacities of judges-is equivalent to the
aretaic notion of a thin theory of virtue. But institutionalism
requires more than this, because successful institutional
architecture requires more than a thin theory of judicial virtue.
An excellent institutional architect must be a phronimos, with
the ability to make complex practical judgments under
conditions of uncertainty.
Thus, institutionalism points us in the direction of
virtue. This leads naturally to the next question. How can we
create a virtuous judiciary? Can we map a path for the law that
is a road to virtue?
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C. The Path of the Law and the Road to Virtue
The introduction to this Essay made a series of
provocative claims. It may disappoint the reader, but I shall
not attempt to prove those claims now. (This is yet another
case of academic bait and switch!) I claimed that Justices are
marked more by virtue than by vice, and that the political
branches are deliberately aiming at the appointment of
mediocre but ideologically committed judges. Whether these
claims are true depends on very complex and contested
empirical judgments. But for the sake of argument, let us
assume that these claims are substantially correct. That is, let
us assume that many judges on both our lowest and our
highest courts lack the judicial virtues, especially the virtue of
constitutional justice as lawfulness. Is this situation inevitable
or is there a road to virtue?
Let us suppose that the rule of law provides very great
goods. Among the benefits of the rule of law are predictability
and certainty, which in turn facilitate planning. The rule of law
may also increase voluntary compliance with legal norms and
therefore reduce the costs of law enforcement. Yet another
benefit of the rule of law is conflict avoidance. It seems
plausible to believe that the rule of law is a great good to
groups with diverse interests and ideologies. Suppose that
these goods are so large, that almost all political factions would
prefer to maintain the rule of law, even at the price of losing
out on all or most of the groups' agenda on controversial legal
issues.
If this were the case, then it might well be that an
overlapping consensus" could support the appointment and
ratification of judges who placed a very high value on the rule
of law. That is, political actors might be persuaded that the
politicization of judicial appointments is too high a price to pay
for short term gains on particularly controversial issues.
Familiar questions about prisoner's dilemmas and defection
arise, and familiar solutions such as the development of
informal norms or bargains might be offered.
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I cannot demonstrate that there is a realistic path to the
restoration of judicial virtue, but I am also unaware of any
argument that shows that no trail can be blazed. What does
seem clear is that the practical case for judicial virtue is not
aided by popularization of the assumption that judicial
incompetence is a given-an institutional fact. Sunstein and
Vermeule argue that one unintended consequence of purposive
interpretation may be legislative carelessness. Likewise, an
unintended consequence of institutional analysis that eschews
the aretaic turn might be to reinforce the causal factors that
lead to judicial incompetence. Virtue jurisprudence does not
run this risk. When we make the aretaic turn in constitutional
theory, we are inevitably driven to the conclusion that
constitutional virtue is the sine qua non of constitutional
justice.
